

SANTAYANA'S
CHAIR
JOSEPH EPSTEIN

the weekly Standard

OCTOBER 3, 2005

\$3.95



HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA

THE LEFT UNIVERSITY *BY JAMES PIERESON*

THE SENSITIVE UNIVERSITY *BY HARVEY MANSFIELD*

PLUS

Christopher Caldwell
on the German election



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The screenshot shows the PhRMA website homepage. At the top, there's a banner with a photo of people in a boat and the text "East St. Louis, Ark." Below the banner are several navigation links: About PhRMA, Wellness in Development, Patient Assistance Programs, Publications, and News Room. A sidebar on the left has sections for Innovation, Education, Safety, and Issues. The main content area features three news stories: "America's Pharmaceutical Companies Increase Relief Efforts; More Than \$120 Million Raised So Far" (09/23/2005), "Drug Inflation Lower Than Overall Medical Price Increases, According to New Study" (08/02/2005), and "America's Pharmaceutical Industry Announces Guidelines on Direct-to-Consumer Advertising" (08/02/2005). There are also sections for "Did You Know?", "2004", and "Innovation.org". At the bottom, there are links to buy safedrugs.info, clinicalstudyresults.org, international.phrma.org, and phrmafoundation.org.

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PhRMA

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Clinton Revisionism

Last week, former President Bill Clinton told his staffer-turned-ABC talking head George Stephanopoulos that the U.S. government had “no evidence that there was any weapons of mass destruction [in Iraq].” And Clinton has the gall to accuse Bush of lying?

Here’s Clinton on July 22, 2003, on *Larry King Live*: “When I left office, there was a substantial amount of biological and chemical material unaccounted for.” And in October 2003, some six months after the war ended, Portuguese prime minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso discussed WMD with Clinton. Said Barroso: “When Clinton was here recently he told me he was absolutely convinced, given his years in the White House and the access to privileged information which he had, that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction until the end of the Saddam regime.”

Details, details. In an interview last month with Wolf Blitzer, Clinton said of

the Iraq war: “I never thought it had much to do with the war on terror.” Come again? In a speech on February 17, 1998, Clinton warned of threats from an “unholy axis” of terrorists and rogue states, and declared: “There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.”

Later that spring came this passage from the Clinton administration’s indictment of Osama bin Laden: “Al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the government of Iraq.”

That summer, no fewer than six senior Clinton officials accused Iraq of providing chemical weapons expertise to al Qaeda in Sudan. It was this collaboration that administration officials cited to justify the destruction of the al Shifa

pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. Sandy Berger, Clinton’s national security adviser, wrote in the *Washington Times* that the administration had “information linking bin Laden to the Sudanese regime and to the al Shifa plant.”

Berger continued: “We had physical evidence indicating that al Shifa was the site of chemical weapons activity,” allowing that al Shifa might have been a dual-use facility. “Other products were made at al Shifa. But we have seen such dual-use plants before—in Iraq. And, indeed, we have information that Iraq has assisted chemical weapons activity in Sudan.”

Clinton’s revisionism is hardly surprising. He has his wife’s future in an increasingly antiwar Democratic party to worry about. But the next time Stephanopoulos hosts his old boss, we’d like to see him ask about al Shifa and the Iraqi collaboration with al Qaeda that the Clinton administration once claimed took place at the plant. ♦

Harvard’s Principles

How does Harvard Law School dean HElena Kagan feel about the federal government’s ban on gays in the military? “I abhor” such discrimination, she announced back in October 2003. It is “repugnant,” a “moral injustice of the first order,” even. Therefore—moral injustices of the first order being the sort of thing Harvard frowns on—Kagan has throughout her deanship enforced the law school’s 26-year-old ban on cooperation with recruiters from employers who exclude homosexuals. Except as regards the Pentagon.

There’s this federal law called the Solomon Amendment, see. And under that law, an institution that “prohibits or in effect prevents” Defense Department recruitment efforts on its campus thereby forfeits eligibility for federal funding. Meaning that Kagan’s refusal to com-

promise her convictions threatens to cost Harvard somewhere between \$400 and \$500 million in federal research grants each year. Meaning that, come to think of it, there are worse things in life than moral injustice, aren’t there?

In an email to the “HLS Community” last week, Dean Kagan explained “how much I regret making this exception.” And she continues to believe that Pentagon hiring policies are “deeply wrong.” But hey, there was money involved. And Harvard University—which has to limp along on total assets of barely \$60 billion—obviously can’t afford to start taking its own righteousness that seriously, now, can it? ♦

Edwards on Earmarks

With the media’s eye on Hillary Clinton’s presumed quest for the 2008 Democratic nod, John Edwards

saw in Hurricane Katrina an opportunity to resuscitate his political fortunes. Speaking before the D.C.-based Center for American Progress last week, Edwards hit Bush for pursuing policies that hurt “the least of us and the most vulnerable.” He even accused Bush of turning a blind eye to congressional pork-barrel spending, saying Bush “never met an earmark he wouldn’t approve.” Edwards must be taking a cue from John Kerry, who was famously for the \$87 billion for our troops before he was against it. In 2003, presidential candidate Edwards told Iowa voters that he wasn’t a fan of earmarks but there wasn’t much he could do about it.

Because his colleagues slipped pork items into large appropriations bills, he claimed, “it’s almost impossible to know what you’re voting on.” But that wasn’t true. Any member of his staff could easily have identified hundreds of pork

Scrapbook



items, including those earmarked for North Carolina. Edwards also opposed many amendments sponsored by Senator John McCain that would have stripped pork from appropriations bills. One would have used the savings for veterans claims adjudication. Another would have eliminated a \$2 million earmark (on top of the \$1.5 million earmarked the previous year) to refurbish a statue of Vulcan, God of Fire and Iron, in Birmingham, Alabama. Today, McCain and Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma are trying to get senators to forswear pork projects to help offset Katrina's reconstruction costs. If anyone believes a Senator Edwards would now be supporting them, THE SCRAPBOOK

has a \$223 million "bridge to nowhere" to sell you in rural Alaska. ♦

Eugene Explains It All

A fine moment in explanatory journalism, from Eugene Robinson's Sept. 20 *Washington Post* column:

"I'm a print-media guy to the bone, but I have to give props to the way my colleagues in television have covered Hurricane Katrina and the devastation of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. (Note to Tom [Brokaw] and Dan [Rather]: 'Props' is a good thing.)"

Eugene, baby, talk to the hand! That slang is so 10 years ago—get over your bad self now. ♦

Simon Wiesenthal, 1908-2005

The death of Simon Wiesenthal, full of age and honors, is not a tragedy. But it was the central tragedy of the 20th century, the Holocaust, which transfigured his life, and made his name indelible in history's account book.

Wiesenthal had barely survived the German death camps, and was well into middle age, when he founded a "documentation center" in his native Austria to track down Nazi war criminals and bring them to trial. At a time when Europe had barely recovered from the shock of the war, and the past was already being distorted and obscured, Wiesenthal took it upon himself to seek neither "closure" nor some transcendent meaning in Treblinka and Auschwitz, but to express the outrage of civilization by pursuing truth and justice. As Walter Berns wrote in 1979, "Wiesenthal allows us to see that it is right, morally right, to be angry with criminals and to express that anger publicly, officially, and in an appropriate manner."

Wiesenthal's name became synonymous with holding war criminals to account, but in the realm of retributive justice, two guiding principles made him unique. First, he did not believe in collective punishment—Germans who did the right thing deserved recognition—and he insisted on documentary evidence for accusations. In a world in which crimes against humanity are charged every day, and often on the basis of competing ideology, he personified the standard for justice, not revenge.

As Simon Wiesenthal knew, the Holocaust happened to the Jews; but war crimes and genocide—from Armenia to Rwanda—are shameful chapters in the history of the world, which cannot be forgotten, concealed, or excused. ♦

Casual

SANTAYANA'S CHAIR

I have been reading, with immense pleasure, the first four volumes of *The Letters of George Santayana* in the handsome edition published by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. I read them with my first cup of tea before breakfast, usually in short takes, between ten and twenty pages at a go. They give my day a bit of tone, elevating me just a touch above the torrent of mundanities that are to follow.


The letters thus far published are from 1868 to 1932—Santayana's birth and death dates are 1863 and 1952—and four more volumes are planned. Santayana's prose was richly aphoristic and as elegantly cadenced as his name. He was one of those sensible people who, to save time, became extremely smart when young. The level and ratio per page of amusing, often profound observations is impressively high. On a fellowship studying in Germany, he notes the utter incapacity of Germans for boredom, which to me explains a lot.

No one was more happily detached than Santayana. At 48, he had finally come into enough money to flee, with unalloyed delight, his job in the philosophy department at Harvard. He lived out his days alone ("I find solitude the best company"), in various temporary quarters in Europe ("To me, it seems a dreadful indignity to have a soul controlled by geography"). A victim of what he called "the contemplative disease," he wished to observe the world and as clearly as possible, which, he understood, is finally not all that clearly. "My philosophy," he wrote, "has always been that disillusion is the only safe foundation for happiness."

Reading along one morning, I came across the following passage in a letter

to Santayana's wealthy Harvard classmate, Charles Augustus Strong, who allowed him a room and the use of his apartment when in Paris: "I have bought an arm chair—blue and grey striped velour, walnut frame, warranted genuine Directoire [made, that is, between 1795 and 1800]—which suits me very well for writing (although most people would find it too low). It

doesn't jar with the other furniture, I think, but it can always be relegated to the petit-salon if you think it *de trop*."



Sometime in the middle 1960s I had written a review of a number of reissues of Santayana's books for the *New Republic*. Not long after, I received a letter from Austria, on chambray-blue stationery, from a man with a Dutch-sounding name. He announced that he was one of Santayana's last students at Harvard and was in possession of an armchair that once belonged to his professor and wondered if I might like to have it.

I wrote back to say that I would be honored to have Santayana's armchair, and that I hoped that my correspondent would allow me to pay whatever shipping charges were entailed in sending it to Chicago. Not only would he allow me to pay for shipping, he revealed, but he also wanted \$800 as the purchase price for

the chair. At the time eight hundred dollars was rather a big ticket, at least for me, and then doubt crept in: How could I know the chair really belonged to Santayana? Maybe this man sold lots of Santayana—and perhaps not a few Henry Adams and Mark Twain—armchairs to culture-gullible Americans.

Thanks to the MIT edition of Santayana's letters, I now know that my correspondent, a man named Andrew Joseph Onderdonk who was a Wall Street lawyer and expert in international law, was offering me the real goods. With World War I about to break out, Santayana, hoping to lighten the load of the small number of his possessions in Strong's Paris apartment, wrote to Strong, "Onderdonk writes that he will be glad to relieve me of the chair."

Santayana writes to Strong that Onderdonk is among those former students who, after a few years "in the world," seem "to have no intellectual interests or clearness left." He notes that his mother is "a Viennese Jewess of sixty, very flirtatious and friendly but a good soul." A sister is mentioned. Onderdonk visits Santayana from time to time in Paris. Elsewhere he writes that Onderdonk has grown "so fat that he can't open his eyes." Yet Onderdonk wrote Santayana's will, and was, briefly, his literary executor.

Whether Onderdonk, like Santayana, remained a bachelor I do not know. Considering that he was a Jew, his shoring up in Vienna seems an odd fact. One assumes that he didn't remain there during the Nazi era. Where, through that period, did he store Santayana's chair? Having graduated Harvard in 1910, he must have been in his late seventies when he offered to sell me the chair. Was he broke? By 1966 what condition was the chair in? And where is it now?

But for \$800 (plus shipping) and a want of faith in my fellow man, I could be sitting in George Santayana's armchair, and writing, I somehow feel, much better than I do now.

JOSEPH EPSTEIN

Correspondence

STATE OF THE REVOLUTION

ANDREW FERGUSON's criticism of the supposed conservative revolution that pattered out before it ever began a decade ago is harsh but quite accurate ("Symposium: Older & Wiser?" Sept. 19).

Ferguson is nothing if not subtle, and I had this funny feeling as I read the piece that he realizes the pachydermous "Rambo" (i.e., Newt Gingrich) portrayed on THE WEEKLY STANDARD's cover 10 years ago celebrating the Republican takeover of Congress is now just a sad reminder of what might have been.

When the only powerful speeches at the 2004 GOP convention were delivered by a moderate-to-left Austrian bodybuilder and a *Democrat*, it seems that conservatives are just going through the motions when they talk about the "significance" of the Republican victory last year. But I do have one question for Ferguson: What does he think he accomplished in his piece with his statement of the obvious regarding the narcissism that permeates the blogosphere, other than sounding like those in the "traditional" liberal media who are resentful that someone else is hogging their time in front of the mirror?

TOM MASCANTONIO
Philadelphia, PA

UNLIKE ANDREW FERGUSON, I have found some good blogs, but the state of conservative TV and radio is depressing. I am convinced, for instance, that Sean Hannity, who I take to be well-meaning, is unable to produce a cogent argument in his favor about anything. It reminds me of Monty Python's Argument Clinic, in which the client says argument is a logical series of statements intended to establish a proposition rather than the automatic gainsaying of what the other person says. Hannity declares liberals wrong and shakes his head that they cannot see the weaknesses of their stances. If only he had an argument to support his own position . . .

SCOTT SCHULER
Odenton, MD


NEWER ORLEANS

BORN AND RAISED in uptown New Orleans, I hurried to read Matt

Labash's "Notes from Under Water" (Sept. 19), and I was heartened to find this: "It has occurred to many New Orleanians I talk to that if in fact the city is rebuilt, maybe this time it'll be done right."

I hope his words reach my own friends and relatives, now scattered throughout the South, who are yearning for and planning their own return.

I cannot be sure, though. During the decades since I left, I've watched my charming hometown decay. Crime, corruption, dismal schools, poverty, and potholes and trash in the streets seemed to draw little attention in what everyone liked to call "the Big Easy, the City that Care Forgot."



If New Orleans did not take care of itself when it was not under water, how could it have been expected to save itself from this disaster? Can a new New Orleans turn from self-indulgence to self-responsibility? How I hope Matt Labash is right.

MANON MCKINNON
Falls Church, VA

WHATEVER, DUDE

IN Mark D. Tooley's "Three Cheers for the Syrians" (Aug. 29), National Council of Churches general secretary Rev. Bob Edgar is quoted as saying: "I support more than marriage the love between two people, and I don't differentiate whether it is between a man and a

woman or a woman and a woman or a man and a man or whatever."

Whatever what, Rev. Edgar? A goat? A brother and a sister (or better yet, two sisters or two brothers)? NAMBLA? To those of us who are disgusted with the direction many Protestant churches are taking regarding moral virtue (and it goes way beyond homosexuality), the attitude of these churches seems to be just that—"whatever." It is why pews are emptying in those churches, and filling in others.

DAVID CRUTHERS
Groton Long Point, CT

PASS THE MALAISE?

IN "When Pointing Fingers . . ." (Sept. 19), John J. DiJulio Jr. writes that a key lesson from the Hurricane Katrina experience is that running (and controlling) the federal government successfully has become just too big a job for this or any president. I haven't heard such defeatism about the powerlessness of the office of president since . . . well, the Carter years.

KEVIN BRUNS
Potomac, MD

SORTING OUT THE SHOOTS

TERRY EASTLAND's tribute to the late Chief Justice Rehnquist ("Farewell to the Chief," Sept. 19) begins with this observation: "In *The Federalist*, James Madison observed that judges are 'shoots from the executive stock.' With this phrase, Madison was making a point about where, in a government of separated powers, judges come from; and of course, the answer is the executive, since the Constitution plainly sets forth that it is the president who has the authority to select judges." From this, Eastland concludes that because "judges are shoots from the executive stock only, . . . a president can try, through his 'shoots,' to alter the jurisprudential direction of the courts—the Supreme Court included."

The problem with this attempted truism, though, is that Madison's metaphor of "shoots from the executive stock" can plausibly, and more interestingly, be read as referring not to the presidential appointment of judges, but to

Correspondence

the conceptual relationship between the executive and judicial powers.

After all, many early discussions of separation of powers, including Locke's, assumed that the judiciary was just part of the executive, in that judges, like the executive as a whole, were charged with enforcing in particular cases the laws enacted by the legislative branch. Part of the genius of American constitutionalism, already apparent in *The Federalist*, was to meld a bit of Locke with a bit of Montesquieu and a lot of common law, and to come to recognize that the judiciary, though a "shoot" from the "executive stock," nevertheless possessed a vital and distinct role, and required institutional independence to fulfill that role.

The best role the president can play is not to try, by his own exercise of sheer will, to "alter the jurisprudential direction of the courts," but rather, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to nurture a judiciary that is, as any good shoot should be, hardy and robust—and capable, in its own growth, of surprising us all.

PERRY DANE
Camden, NJ

SPOT ON

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION should listen to Christopher Hitchens, who in "A War to Be Proud Of" (Sept. 5 / Sept. 12) shines light on the failure of the administration to communicate continually the gravity of the Iraq war and to conquer the ensuing political battle. Hitchens also provides readers with a clear and concise list of positive consequences of the Iraq war.

As Hitchens rightly suggests, if the citizens of the world truly understood what was and continues to be at stake, the political front of the war against terror would face a remarkably different horizon.

ZACHARY A. DAVIS
Lexington, KY

HOW 'BOUT DEMO-BOMBS?

RICHARD B. FRANK's "Why Truman Dropped the Bomb" (Aug. 8) certainly lends support for Truman's decision to drop the bomb. Taken at face value, a reader would reasonably conclude that the intercepted documents left the United States with little choice. One should keep in mind, however, that the fact that the Japanese were seeking an end to hostilities is a tacit admission that they were going to lose. Additionally, there are good reasons to believe that a demonstration could have accomplished the same result as the two bombs.

The official reason for not offering a demonstration was that we had only two bombs, and we could not risk a dud. Accepting the first part of that claim, I think the second is open to challenge. I see no problem had we invited top Japanese diplomats and nuclear physicists to view the film of the Trinity experiment and to allow them to visit the site with Geiger counters. Should they still not be convinced, then a demo would follow.

As a former member of the Manhattan Project, I know that we could easily afford some duds, and we would only need one success. If the Japanese remained unconvinced after a successful demo, then we could proceed as we did. The onus of dropping the bombs on innocent civilians would then be on their shoulders, not ours.

BYRON ARISON
Watchung, NJ

RICHARD B. FRANK RESPONDS: The information we now possess on the reaction of Japanese leaders to Hiroshima convinces me that even Mr. Arison's thoughtfully refined demonstration plan would not have worked. When the United States announced that an atomic bomb had destroyed Hiroshima, Japanese militarists instantly erected not one but two lines of defense. The first was

that, whatever destroyed Hiroshima, it was not an atomic bomb, or at least that fact would not be conceded until there was an investigation.

Consequently, the Japanese dispatched an investigation team including the great Japanese physicist Dr. Nishina Yoshio. But Admiral Toyoda Soemu, the operational head of the Imperial Navy, also immediately articulated a second line of defense. Toyoda pronounced that even if the United States had destroyed Hiroshima with an atomic weapon, the United States could not have that many of them, or they would not be that powerful, or the United States would be dissuaded from using them by international pressure.

Ironically, Japan's own nuclear program explains this reaction. That program did not give them a weapon, but it did provide insight to the top levels of Japan's leadership on just how incredibly difficult it was to produce fissionable material in quantity. From what we know now, the Japanese reaction to a demonstration almost certainly would have been to demand a series of detonations to disprove Toyoda's argument.

This would have called the U.S. bluff since there were not that many bombs (nine between August 6 and November 1) and substantial intervals between when each would become available. Meanwhile, the Japanese could effectuate countermeasures, like moving Allied POWs and civilian internees into cities.

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THE WEEKLY STANDARD

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Back to Basics

George W. Bush was reelected almost a year ago with more than 62 million votes—the most ever cast for a presidential candidate. Bush won 51 percent of the vote—the first presidential candidate to win an absolute majority of the popular vote since 1988. Bush's agenda for his second term was straightforward: He would lead us toward victory in the war on terror. He would move the federal courts in the direction of constitutionalism and restraint. He would preserve and extend the economic growth, spurred by tax cuts, of the last couple of years of his first term.

Since Inauguration Day, the administration has had its troubles. Iraq, despite the extraordinary January 30 elections, remains unstable and insecure. Elsewhere in the war on terror, we have pursued fruitless negotiations with Iran; we have trumpeted as a success a meaningless, Clintonian deal with North Korea; and we have continued to fail to rebuild our military and our intelligence capabilities so they are commensurate to the tasks we face. At home, the administration devoted six months to a misbegotten effort to reform Social Security.

Oh well. All of this is water over the levee, so to speak. The good news is that Bush is poised to rebound by getting back to basics, and getting back to a core, winning agenda.

In Iraq, the administration has increased troop strength, and the military has been allowed to begin fighting a proper counterinsurgency. The offensive against the terrorists in northwestern and western Iraq seems to be going well, and, as the *Washington Post* acknowledged in a September 22 headline, "Bit by Bit, Iraq's Army and Police Force Show Signs of Progress." The *Post*'s reporting makes clear that such progress will depend on a continued robust American troop presence, and on continued Iraqi confidence in that presence.

In this regard, the administration's commitment to adding newly trained Iraqi troops to our own, rather than viewing them as immediate replacements, and the president's stifling of foolish Rumsfeldian talk of an American drawdown, has been helpful. As the president reiterated last Thursday, "the only way the terrorists can win is if we lose our nerve and abandon the mission." And, he added, "that's not going to happen on my watch." Meanwhile, the political process in Iraq continues to move ahead toward the October 15 constitutional vote.

With respect to the economic agenda, Social Security

reform is now dead. This clears the way for a focus on economic growth, and on tax cuts. The administration will correctly insist that the budget reconciliation bill include an extension of the capital gains and dividend tax cuts. In the face of what will likely be a slowing economy in 2006, and in light of the success of these supply-side tax cuts (4 percent growth over the last two years, and a 15 percent increase in tax revenues last year, the largest ever annual increase in federal revenues), the administration needs to insist on these cuts, and move as quickly as possible to make the other tax cuts permanent.

It might also get serious about spending restraint. Instead of bridling at constructive suggestions from friends on the Hill ranging from Indiana's Mike Pence, leader of the House conservatives, to Arizona's John McCain in the Senate, the president should take the lead in making budget reconciliation an occasion for spending rescissions and reductions. For instance, given the Katrina costs, why not delay for at least a year the introduction of the swollen and unwieldy Medicaid prescription drug benefit passed by Congress in 2003?

As for the courts, the Roberts nomination has been a success, substantively and politically. There will be more of a fight over the O'Connor seat, true, but it will be a winning fight. And there are plenty of outstanding candidates. Michael McConnell is as widely respected a constitutional scholar as Roberts was a litigator, and had bipartisan support when he was elevated to the 10th Circuit in 2002. There are other distinguished appellate judges like Alice Batchelder of the 6th Circuit, Edith Jones of the 5th, and Michael Luttig of the 4th. There are first-rate U.S. District Court judges like Lee Rosenthal in Houston, who would have the advantage of bringing real-world judicial trial experience to the High Court. Or the president could choose to replace Justice O'Connor, formerly of the Arizona court, with another state court judge like the highly regarded Maura Corrigan of the Michigan Supreme Court. There are others.

Ronald Reagan used to say that the right policy is often simple—though not easy to carry out. Efforts to win the war, cut taxes and spending, and appoint constitutionalist judges will of course encounter real-world difficulties and political obstacles. But back to basics is the path to political health and successful governance.

—William Kristol

Pence on Fire

The revolt of the small government Republicans.

BY FRED BARNES

SMALL GOVERNMENT conservatives have revolted against President Bush and the Republican leadership of the Senate and the House. Their goal, with hurricane recovery costs soaring, is what it's always been: to hold down spending and restrain the growth of government. It is an impossible dream or close to impossible. The small government brigade is a distinct minority in Congress. Their strength is outside Congress. They reflect the anxiety of the Republican party's base, conservatives and moderates both, over the uncontrolled spending and massive expansion of government following hurricane Katrina. "The base is killing us," a Republican senator says.

There's another source of strength for small government conservatives. One congressional Republican says an old adage of Newt Gingrich is applicable: Never assume that anybody is organized or there's a grand plan that's in effect. The president is concentrated on emergency relief and recovery in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Congress is in disarray. But small government conservatives do have a plan—actually two plans—for paying for a portion of the hurricane costs by offsetting spending cuts.

In the House, the conservative Republican Study Committee proposed "budget options" that would cut spending by as much as \$102 billion in one year. The RSC scheme would delay the start of the Medicare prescription drug benefit, scheduled for January 1, for at least one year.

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Led by Republican representative Mike Pence of Indiana, RSC leaders met last week with Josh Bolten, the White House budget director, and with House Republican leaders, who rejected their plan as politically unrealistic, which it is.

In the Senate, six Republicans offered a series of "options to save spending by reducing non-defense spending growth." By merely freezing



Mike Pence

government conservatives antedates Katrina and the current argument over spending on relief and recovery. They have a philosophical difference with the president and with their own leaders in Congress. They favor sharply limited government and minimal spending. Bush and his congressional allies prefer a more expansive role for government and worry less about increased spending. Bush has been called a big government conservative (by me), but that label is inapt because it implies he's a liberal. He's not, but neither is he a small government conservative.

A series of expensive measures championed by Bush and passed by Congress—the farm, highway, and energy bills, for instance—has caused the anger of small government conservatives to simmer. In the House, 25 Republicans voted against the Medicare drug benefit in 2003, nearly prompting its defeat and alienating the White House and party leaders in Congress. Nonetheless, most of the 25 remain proud of their "no" vote. Sununu voted against the Medicare, energy, highway, and farm bills. Yet he's been skillful in maintaining his ties to the White House and Senate leaders.

The RSC's Pence hasn't been. Indeed, he is loathed by Bush aides and House Republican leaders. They blame him for going to the press with proposed spending cuts before coming to them, cuts they insist can't get more than a few dozen votes. They claim he has set the bar so high for cuts that anything short of \$100 billion, which Congress might actually approve, will appear puny. Perhaps, but the real effect of the RSC's hype of spending restraint is that serious cuts (or "offsets") are now far more likely.

Bush bears less blame for out-of-control spending than Congress itself. True, he's never vetoed a spending bill. But he cajoled Congress into slashing the level of highway spending. And his budgets, aside from defense outlays, have called for grad-

discretionary spending—that means everything but entitlements—for a single year, \$47.9 billion would be saved. Limiting the freeze to non-defense, non-homeland security spending would still save \$36.2 billion, according to Senator John Sununu of New Hampshire. "If Congress simply put in place mechanisms to control the growth of discretionary spending at or near inflation, the two-year cost savings is well in excess of \$20 billion," Sununu says. Slowing the growth of spending in such ways is more realistic.

The resentment felt by the small

DON'T LET THEM MAKE A MOCKERY OUT OF DEMOCRACY.

Last month, the House of Representatives passed an amendment that would prohibit slaughterhouses in Texas and Illinois from shipping the meat of American horses abroad.

The amendment to the Agricultural Appropriations Act withdraws federal funding for the inspectors retained to inspect horsemeat bound for France, Belgium and other foreign countries from one of these three remaining foreign-owned slaughterhouses. One is French-owned, two are Belgian-owned.

All of the meat from the 60,000 horses slaughtered is exported abroad for human consumption. No U.S. interests are involved. EXCEPT . . . the American taxpayer has UNKNOWINGLY been subsidizing this activity by paying the costs related to meat inspection.

Perhaps the vote withdrawing funding was so lopsided (it passed with a margin of 111 votes) because the House saw the need to correct this injustice.

On the 20th of September, an amendment with EXACTLY THE SAME wording passed the Senate 69 to 28. Now the Bill goes to conference.

We wouldn't be concerned if we didn't know about the pro-slaughter opposition's skill at achieving their ends behind closed doors. Up until now, their underhanded machinations have frustrated and saddened horse lovers of every stripe.

While an overwhelmingly majority of our leaders in Congress voted to end this practice, we are fearful that the opposition will work to thwart the will of the House and the Senate.

If the Bill goes into conference for revisions and if EXACTLY the same language is not present in the amendment when it emerges, it will give offense to EVERYONE who believes in the democratic process.

We cannot let this happen.



Please support H.R. 503 to end horse slaughter in America.
For more information, please visit www.horse-protection.org.

ual decreases in discretionary spending. His 2006 budget sought to hold all non-entitlement spending, including for defense and homeland security, to less than the rate of inflation. That, however, was pre-Katrina and pre-Rita.

The record of the congressional Republican leadership on curbing spending is abysmal. In response to the RSC, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay claimed all the fat in the federal budget had already been scraped away. That inflamed small government conservatives and even moderates, and DeLay was forced to retract his statement. When Bolten addressed Senate Republicans last week, he didn't apologize for Bush's insistence on financing the recovery of the Gulf Coast with billions of federal dollars. He pointed out that Republicans hadn't adopted most of the cuts outlined by the White House in the 2006 budget. If Congress wants to cut more now, he told the senators, go to it.

Getting Republican leaders, much less the rest of Congress, to agree to spending cuts is an enormous task. Even some small government conservatives want to protect the "earmarks" for transportation projects in their districts. Nor is the White House ready to send a list of recommended cuts to Congress. Bush is still distracted by the immediate needs of the recovery. As usual, Democrats are no help. Their impulse is to raise taxes, just as it was before the hurricanes. Bush has wisely ruled out tax hikes.

Though few in number, the small government conservatives are a problem for Bush. His power as president is based partly on his ability to marshal huge Republican majorities in Congress along with a handful of Democratic renegades. If the RSC types—30 or more of them in the House and a half-dozen in the Senate—reject his hurricane recovery legislation, the Bush majority may vanish. White House aides profess not to be worried about the revolt of small government conservatives. But it's a bigger threat than they imagine. ♦

The Buck Still Hasn't Stopped

The Volcker report on Oil-for-Food is sadly incomplete. **BY CLAUDIA ROSETT**

ON SEPTEMBER 7, Paul Volcker's inquiry into the Oil-for-Food program issued its "definitive report" on the biggest relief program—also the biggest scandal—in the history of the United Nations. The investigation alone cost \$34 million, took over 16 months, and employed some 75 staff from 28 countries. Running to four volumes and totaling 847 pages, the report is hefty. But definitive it is not.

Volcker's report is at best a beginning, and a skewed and incomplete one at that. To be fair, credit is due to some of the investigators on Volcker's staff, who have conducted many interviews and toiled down many byways of the U.N. paper trail to produce such items as footnote 64, page 27, Volume III. Here we find that "kickbacks were levied on all or nearly all contracts" among the thousands of U.N.-approved deals done by Saddam Hussein, as the program, during its final years, hit its full multibillion annual stride. The investigators have also painstakingly documented such findings as the one on page 124 of Volume III. Here we find that, during Oil-for-Food, Secretary General Kofi Annan, his deputy secretary-general, Louise Fréchette, and his chief of staff, Iqbal Riza, "were all informed of the issue of kickbacks, but remained passive."

But somewhere between the Volcker committee's labors on the ground and the conclusions of the three commissioners at the top—former Fed chairman Volcker, South African jus-

tice Richard Goldstone, and Swiss lawyer Mark Pieth—a fog descends. Despite the load of detail, illuminating and deeply damning to the United Nations, the result is a patchwork of dropped leads and watered-down judgments, leading in some cases to unwarranted and even bizarre conclusions.

Not that getting to the bottom of Oil-for-Food could ever be easy. The program was vast. From 1996 to 2003, it was supposed to ensure that more than \$110 billion worth of oil sales and relief purchases contracted by Saddam's regime were honest, and that the proceeds were fairly distributed to ease the suffering of more than 24 million people in U.N.-sanctioned Iraq. But, under cover of U.N. secrecy, with the United Nations' approval, and while the international body assured the public that Oil-for-Food was one of its most efficient programs ever, Saddam, by Volcker's estimate, skimmed and smuggled his way to \$12.8 billion in illicit income. And this is a conservative estimate that omits some rather obvious scams. By more complete estimates, Saddam swiped as much as \$17 billion or upwards. There is abundant evidence—turned up by Congress, Treasury, the CIA, private investigators, and the media—that these illicit billions went not only to build palaces, but also to fortify Saddam's Baathist dictatorship, restock at least his conventional arsenal, bribe politicians, pay off accomplices worldwide, and fill secret bank accounts that may have funded terrorists during Saddam's reign—and may still be funding them today. This picture of where the money went is vital to grasping

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the full implications of the United Nations' corruption and dereliction in running Oil-for-Food. But Volcker has deferred almost all discussion of it to an "additional report," due out with a lot less fanfare next month.

If Volcker's September 7 "main report" is to be the final word on U.N. management of this fiasco, then the bottom line is this: Under a program involving thousands of U.N. employees, nine U.N. agencies, and an administrative budget totaling \$1.4 billion, the United Nations abetted Saddam Hussein in one of the biggest heists in history—and no one, except for a couple of third-tier U.N. officials, is being punished for it. Annan, having taken "responsibility," is still at his post. His deputy, Louise Fréchette, having directly supervised the corrupt official heading Oil-for-Food, is now in charge of U.N. reform. And the former head of Oil-for-Food, Benon Sevan, accused by Volcker of taking at least \$147,000 in bribes from Saddam, has been allowed to cash in his U.N. pension and leave the country.

The two U.N. officials penalized to date played relatively small roles in the Oil-for-Food saga. One is a former political affairs officer, Joseph Stephanides, who was never accused of taking a bribe and is appealing Annan's decision to fire him. The other is a Russian staffer in the U.N. procurement department, Alexander Yakovlev, portrayed in an initial, interim report from Volcker this past February as a champion of U.N. integrity. Only after media reports documenting otherwise did Volcker report in August that Yakovlev had tried unsuccessfully to solicit a bribe via Oil-for-Food. (Yakovlev entered a guilty plea in a Manhattan federal court last month for scams that appear to have centered on U.N. business outside Oil-for-Food.)

These are the predictably thin results of a report that, despite such media descriptions as "blistering," arrives again and again at oddly limp conclusions regarding individual U.N. officials. No doubt by the standards of a United Nations unaccus-

tomed to anyone poking through its files, peering at its books, or asking the secretary-general to explain his own organizational chart, Volcker's findings were a sharp rebuke. The preface criticizes not only Oil-for-Food, but the United Nations as a whole, quite rightly, for "managerial weaknesses," "ethical lapses," and "serious instances of illicit, unethical and corrupt behavior," along with a "grievous absence of effective auditing and management controls."

And yet, more than 800 pages later, as the volume wends to Volcker's final recommendation that the United Nations add another branch of bureaucracy by establishing "an office of ethics," the buck still hasn't

Part of the problem is that Volcker has imposed on his inquiry the standards not of a prosecutor, but of an accountant.

stopped. Having enjoyed unlimited access to U.N. records and personnel, Volcker's committee shows a whole series of top officials, including both Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, wandering oblivious through a gauntlet of Iraqi schemes to subvert and manipulate Oil-for-Food via everything from bags of cash to open demands for kickbacks.

Part of the problem is that Volcker has imposed on his inquiry the standards not of a prosecutor, but of an accountant. Faced with a pole too tall to measure by hand, he instead tells us its precise circumference on the ground, and lets it go at that. Much has been aired already of Volcker's account of Annan's strange and abiding ignorance of his own son's lively lobbying for U.N.-related business. So let us focus on another character, Annan's former special adviser Maurice Strong, longtime U.N. guru of good governance. (Strong did depart

the United Nations this spring, but with Annan's office expressing fervent hopes he will soon return.)

At some length, Volcker does the genuine service of laying out how Strong, in mid-1997, received a check for \$988,885 made out to his name (a copy can be found on page 106, Volume II). The check was drawn on a Jordanian bank, funded by Saddam's regime, and delivered by Korean businessman Tongsun Park, who was a U.N. "back-channel" go-between with Saddam. Strong endorsed the check over to a third party to invest in a Strong family-controlled business, Cordex Petroleum. Interviewed by Volcker's team earlier this year, Strong said he did not recall receiving such a check. When shown a copy, he said he did not know the money came from Iraq. Volcker leaves the matter there, concluding that "the Committee has found no evidence that Mr. Strong was involved in Iraqi affairs, matters relating to the [Oil-for-Food] Programme or took any actions at the request of Iraqi officials."

But how hard did the Volcker committee look? In July 1997, the month before Strong cashed the Saddam-backed check, Annan was issuing his first U.N. reform program, reshaping the secretariat. Strong was the major architect of that reform, and was thanked profusely by Annan at the time for "his important contributions." A significant aspect of that reform was the consolidation of the then-new, ad hoc, and diffuse Iraq Oil-for-Food program into a single, more firmly entrenched office. This move tilted control of the daily administration of Oil-for-Food away from the Security Council and toward the secretariat. When the new, unified office set up shop three months later, in October 1997, Annan appointed Sevan as executive director. That marked the beginning of the stretch in which Sevan began taking bribes from Saddam, and the Oil-for-Food program, urged on by Annan, began to grow astronomically in size and scope. Lacking any disclosure of the secret U.N. paper trail that led to the

creation of this office and its expanded mission, it is impossible to know whether Strong took a direct hand in setting up the office from which Sevan then, in effect, collaborated with Saddam. Perhaps Strong had nothing to do with it. But Volcker doesn't even ask the question.

Only in the case of Sevan, already documented in the press before the Volcker inquiry got started in mid-2004, does Volcker assign blame to a specific individual. And even there, the Volcker committee fumbled, issuing an interim report last February, which, after eight months of preliminary investigation, merely rebuked Sevan for engaging in a "grave and continuing conflict of interest." Two weeks later, Sen. Norm Coleman's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations accused Sevan outright of having taken bribes from Saddam. By the time Volcker finally worked around in his third interim report, August 8, to repeating the accusation, Sevan had made use of the intervening months to cash in his U.N. pension and leave New York. He is now widely believed to be back in his native Cyprus, which has no extradition treaty with the United States.

It's all enough to raise questions about the agenda of the Volcker probe itself. As it happens, Rep. Henry Hyde's Committee on International Relations is planning to do just that. Hyde's investigators expect to focus on, among other things, why one of Volcker's lead investigators, Robert Parton, defected this past April with boxes of evidence. Parton explained via his lawyer that he had resigned on "principle" because the second of Volcker's three interim reports had been too soft on Annan. Volcker went through the courts to silence Parton, but that arrangement is about to end. Hyde's inquiry is expected to issue a report on the United Nations later this fall. Coleman's investigators into Oil-for-Food are also due to check in. Federal prosecutors have issued a number of indictments related to U.N. corruption. And—who knows?—Volcker next month gets one more chance. ♦

Fetal Attraction

What the stem cell scientists really want.

BY ROBERT P. GEORGE

THE JOURNAL *Science* late last month published the results of research conducted at Harvard proving that embryonic stem cells can be produced by a method that does not involve creating or destroying a living human embryo. Additional progress will be required to perfect this technique of stem cell production, but few seriously doubt that it will be perfected, and many agree that this can be accomplished in the relatively near future. At the same time, important breakthroughs have been announced by scientists at the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Texas demonstrating that cells derived harmlessly from placental tissue and umbilical cord blood can be induced to exhibit the pluripotency of embryonic stem cells. ("Pluripotency" is the potential of a cell to develop into multiple types of mature cells.)

One would expect that advocates of embryonic stem cell research would be delighted by these developments. After all, they point to uncontroversial ways to obtain embryonic stem cells or their exact equivalent and to create new stem cell lines that are (unlike lines created by destroying embryos) immediately eligible for federal funding. Yet some advocates seem to be unhappy at the news. Why?

The likely answer is ominous.

Up to now, embryonic stem cell advocates have claimed that they are only interested in stem cells harvested from embryos at the blasto-

cyst (or five- to six-day) stage. They have denied any intention of implanting embryos either in the uterus of a volunteer or in an artificial womb in order to harvest cells, tissues, or organs at more advanced stages of embryonic development or in the fetal stage. Advocates are well aware that most Americans, including those who are prepared to countenance the destruction of very early embryos, are not ready to approve the macabre practice of "fetus farming." However, based on the literature I have read and the evasive answers given by spokesmen for the biotechnology industry at meetings of the President's Council on Bioethics, I fear that the long-term goal is indeed to create an industry in harvesting late embryonic and fetal body parts for use in regenerative medicine and organ transplantation.

This would explain why some advocates of embryonic stem cell research are not cheering the news about alternative sources of pluripotent stem cells. If their real goal is fetus farming, then the cells produced by alternative methods will not serve their purposes.

Why would biomedical scientists be interested in fetus farming? Researchers know that stem cells derived from blastocyst-stage embryos are currently of no therapeutic value and may never actually be used in the treatment of diseases. (In a candid admission, South Korean cloning expert Curie Ahn recently said that developing therapies may take "three to five decades.")

In fact, there is not a single embryonic stem cell therapy even in clinical trials. (By contrast, adult and umbilical cord stem cells are already being used in the treatment

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five-part series, the final installment of which was entitled "The Organ Factory: The Case for Harvesting Older Human Embryos."

If we do not put into place a legislative ban on fetus farming, public opposition to the practice could erode. People *now* find it revolting. But what will happen to public sentiment if the research is permitted to go forward and in fact generates treatments for some dreadful diseases or afflictions? I suspect that those in the biotech industry who do look forward to fetus farming are betting that moral opposition will collapse when the realistic prospect of cures is placed before the public.

The ideal legislation to protect human life and preserve public moral sensibilities would ban all production of human embryos for research in which they are destroyed. Unfortunately, Congress is not prepared to pass such legislation. Indeed, a bill passed by the House of Representatives to ban the production of human embryos, for any purpose, by cloning has been stymied in the Senate. (In this one instance, many American liberals decline to follow the lead of Europe—where many jurisdictions ban all human cloning, including the creation of embryos by cloning for biomedical research—or of the United Nations General Assembly, which has called for a complete cloning ban.) So what can be done?

One possibility is to make a preemptive strike against fetus farming by banning the initiation of any pregnancy (whether in a human uterus or artificial womb) for purposes other than the live birth of a child. This has been recommended by the President's Council on Bioethics. Another possible approach would be to add to the safeguards already in the U.S. Code on fetal tissue, stating that it is unlawful for anyone to use, or engage in interstate commerce in, such tissue when the person knows that the pregnancy was initiated in order to produce this tissue. An effective strategy would eliminate what

of 65 diseases.) All informed commentators know that embryonic stem cells cannot be used in therapies because of their tendency to generate dangerous tumors. However, recent studies show that the problem of tumor formation does not exist in cells taken from cows, mice, and other mammals when embryos have been implanted and extracted after several weeks or months of development (i.e. have been gestated to the late embryonic or fetal stage). This means that the real therapeutic potential lies precisely in the practice of fetus farming. Because the developmental process stabilizes cells (which is why we are not all masses of tumors), it is likely true that stem cells, tissues, and organs harvested from human beings at, say, 16 or 18

weeks or later *could* be used in the treatment of diseases.

Scientists associated with a leading firm in the embryonic stem cell field, Advanced Cell Technology, recently published a research paper discussing the use of stem cells derived from cattle fetuses that had been produced by cloning (to create a genetic match). Although the article did not mention human beings, it was plain that the purpose of the research was not to cure diseased cows, but rather to establish the potential therapeutic value of doing precisely the same thing with human beings. For those who have ears to hear, the message is clear. I am hardly the first to perceive this message. *Slate* magazine bioethics writer Will Saletan drew precisely the same conclusion in a remarkable

would otherwise almost certainly emerge as a powerful incentive for the production of thousands of embryos that would be destroyed in perfecting and practicing cloning and fetal farming.

My suspicions and sense of urgency have been heightened by the fact that my home state of New Jersey has passed a bill that specifically authorizes and encourages human cloning for, among other purposes, the harvesting of "cadaveric fetal tissue." A "cadaver," of course, is a dead body. The bodies in question are those of fetuses created by cloning specifically to be gestated and killed as sources of tissues and organs. What the bill envisages and promotes, in other words, is fetus farming. The biotechnology industry put an enormous amount of money into pushing this bill through the New Jersey legislature and is now funding support for similar bills in states around the country.

So we find ourselves at a critical juncture. On the one hand, techniques for obtaining pluripotent stem cells without destroying embryos will, it appears, soon eliminate any plausible argument for killing pre-implantation embryos. This is great news. On the other hand, these developments have, if I am correct, smoked out the true objectives of at least some who have been leading the charge for embryonic stem cell research. Things cannot remain as they are. The battle over embryonic stem cell research will determine whether we as a people move in the direction of restoring our sanctity of life ethic, or go in precisely the opposite direction. Either we will protect embryonic human life more fully than we do now, or we will begin creating human beings precisely as "organ factories." Those of us on the pro-life side must take the measure of the problem quickly so that we can develop and begin implementing a strategy that takes the nation in the honorable direction. ♦

A Passion for Thrift

Republican backbenchers get fiscal with Katrina.

BY JOSEPH LINDSLEY

LAST WEEK, on the terrace of the Cannon House Office Building on Capitol Hill, a crowd of demonstrators from around the country held aloft catchy signs saying things like "Rescue Taxpayers from Floods of Red Ink" and "Deficit Spending is Disaster Pending." Members of the conservative Republican Study Committee, meanwhile, unveiled their assault on the spend-what-you-will attitude plaguing Congress.

The effort, titled "Operation Offset," was initiated by Indiana Republican Mike Pence, chairman of the group, with a twofold goal in mind: Find a way to fund Katrina recovery efforts, and find a way to get federal spending under control.

With damages from Hurricane Katrina estimated to exceed \$200 billion (who knows what Hurricane Rita will add), and recognizing the pitfalls of raising taxes to cover the federal portion of this tab, members of the RSC have their work cut out for them. Though most conservatives are united in lambasting spending-gone-wild, they still debate what should be cut and for how long.

For example, Rep. Ron Lewis of Kentucky urged a moratorium on all nondefense earmarks for congressional districts—but only for a year. Lewis believes that these are the worst of times, requiring every constituency to sacrifice some cherished Paper Industry Hall of Fame or long-sought curriculum for the study of mariachi music (those are

real examples). At the same time, he says, "there are certain projects that absolutely members need to work on behalf of their constituency."

Not Pence. He would be happy if the cuts lasted a little longer—say, forever. "It's almost like when a person is diagnosed with a very serious disease [such as] heart disease," Pence offers. "And the doctor says, 'Well, it would greatly help if you lost weight.' That event, that bad news, becomes the catalyst for the person to make hard choices that they had needed to make for a long time."

The Republican Study Committee's report, "RSC Budget Options 2005," proposes spending reductions under several headings. By far the largest savings to be had come under "Tough Options." Of these, the most controversial would delay for at least one year the Medicare prescription drug program, and repeal the highway earmarks dear to the hearts of legislators. The "Tough Options" could save \$70 billion in 2006 alone. In total, the RSC report identifies potential savings of more than \$1.2 trillion over 10 years.

Some of the savings would come from a laundry list of line items to be eliminated: subsidized loans to graduate students; the Corporation for Public Broadcasting's public funding, which accounts for 15 percent of its budget; "Parents: the Anti-Drug" ads; Medicare reimbursement for penile implants; and so on.

Other proposals would eliminate duplication. The president's Millennium Challenge Accounts, for example, designed to give foreign-aid

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recipients incentives to become fiscally responsible, apparently were a supplement to, not a replacement for, USAID programs that poured money into African corruption; the RSC wants the Millennium Challenge Accounts eliminated, to save \$24.4 billion over a decade.

And the RSC calls for increased accountability: One member, from Maryland, wants to cut funding to any U.N. member nation that votes against U.S. interests more than 50 percent of the time.

Even if some of these programs are slashed—and Pence notes that not every member of the committee agrees with every proposal—how wisely will the folks who initiated all of this waste in the first place spend the money now being directed to the Gulf coast?

One goal the White House and many Republicans want to incorporate into Katrina relief is encouragement of an “ownership society.” To take just one small piece of the proposed Katrina effort, consider job training. The Department of Labor has already issued \$12 million in grants for job training to residents of the states hit by Katrina. These take the form of “worker recovery accounts,” also called “personal reemployment accounts” or “innovation training accounts,” which are part of President Bush’s 2003 High Growth Job Training Initiative. In the wake of Katrina, President Bush proposes to raise the amount of each award from \$3,000 to \$5,000.

How well do federal job training initiatives perform? They’ve been around for more than half a century, some recent permutations being CETA, JTPA, and WIA. No one knows for sure just what they have accomplished. While the Brookings Institution praises job training as one of “government’s 50 greatest endeavors,” the Heritage Foundation’s David B. Muhlhausen says job training, even in its new, more flexible variants, is not “likely to raise the income of participants.”

As currently structured, the program is supposed to work like this:

The “dislocated worker” goes to a One-Stop Career Center, where he can take a skills assessment test and consult a job openings database. If this fails to lead him to a job, the seeker enters the “intensive” phase. He is given a more comprehensive skills assessment, in addition to training in interviewing skills and “punctuality.” If, after this, he still lacks a job, the dislocated worker is offered his individual account, from which to purchase job training of his choice, child care, transportation, or “other supportive services” during the course of a year.

The Department of Labor is required to evaluate this program. Among other things, it tries to measure employer satisfaction with trainees. According to Muhlhausen, however, the department’s studies have no control groups, necessary to shed light on whether trainees would have found jobs anyway. Though the department reports that trainees’ earnings increase, Muhlhausen suggests that those who receive no training may also see their incomes rise, as a result of improved efficiency and skills thanks to actual work experience, rather than training in a classroom.

On the upside, job training accounts now come with an incentive to find work and stay off unemployment: Recipients can keep any unused funds in their account if they are hired within 13 weeks of receiving unemployment insurance and retain their job for at least six months.

Members of Congress involved in the effort to reduce spending and to see that the money saved is intelligently spent in the hurricane-affected states don’t have the luxury of endless, unhurried study. They have to make decisions now, on the basis of imperfect knowledge. One suggestion, though, seems sure-fire.


Given the difficulty individual members have in restraining their desire for funds to finance projects in their districts, constitutional scholar Matthew Spalding, also at Heritage, urges the creation of an independent

entity like the Base Realignment and Closure commission that would select which earmarks to cut, taking the burden off individual members. It could be called the Earmark Reduction to Offset Spending commission, or EROS. Its motto could be “A Passion for Thrift,” in deference to those sign-bearers at last week’s protest. Time will tell if it’s a passion members of Congress share. ♦

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King Abdullah and the Rabbis

Bringing the “Amman Message” to Washington.

BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

WITH ALL the attention focused on the aftermath of Katrina and the coming destruction of Rita, a small gathering on a perfect early fall day in Washington went largely unnoticed. That's understandable, but too bad.

Early on the afternoon of September 21, King Abdullah bin al-Hussein walked briskly to the front of a ballroom at the Ritz Carlton hotel. The 43-year-old Jordanian monarch, wearing a business suit, was surrounded by bodyguards whose suspicious eyes scanned the room. Inside that ring of security, flanking the king as he made his way to the podium, were two young men wearing yarmulkes.

Abdullah's speech was notable both for its content and its audience. Abdullah, a Sunni Muslim, addressed a group of American rabbis. “Muslims from every branch of Islam,” he said, “can now assert without doubt or hesitation that a *fatwa* calling for the killing of innocent civilians—no matter what nationality or religion, Muslim or Jew, Arab or Israeli—is a basic violation of the most fundamental principles of Islam.” Abdullah denounced Abu Musab al Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden by name. Not surprisingly, he received a standing ovation.

The context here is important. Before the Iraq war, we were warned repeatedly that removing Saddam Hussein's regime would foreclose the possibility of such speeches, that it would set the so-called Arab street afire, and that moderate, America-friendly governments in the Middle

East would go to great lengths to distance themselves from the United States. A war in Iraq, skeptical experts predicted, would destabilize the region and have little effect other than to empower extremists.

Even now, as terrorists continue to explode car bombs with alarming frequency, Iraqi constitutional negotiators work to hammer out political arrangements that would have been unthinkable five years ago. Elsewhere, we have seen the codification of women's rights in Kuwait; local voting in Saudi Arabia; and successful elections in Afghanistan and Lebanon. In Egypt, voting this month was marred by corruption. But opposition parties spoke with unprecedented freedom against Hosni Mubarak and his National Democratic party and could protest the outcome of the election with relative impunity. Mubarak, who scoffed at calls for liberalization as recently as last fall, dramatically changed his tone after January's elections in Iraq.

King Abdullah's speech to the rabbis was the latest step in his campaign to rescue Islam from what he calls “fringe elements.” The effort began last November with what the Jordanians immodestly refer to as the “Amman Message”—“a message of tolerance and humanity, rejecting extremism as a deviation from Islamic beliefs.” Abdullah dilated on this theme in a speech September 13 at Catholic University. “The Amman Message is an all-Islamic initiative,” he explained. “It currently involves opinion-makers from across the Islamic world. God willing, it will expand to engage the popular preachers and grassroots activists—what is

called the ‘Muslim street.’” The goal, he continued, “is to take back our religion from the vocal, violent, and ignorant extremists who have tried to hijack Islam over the last hundred years. They do not speak for Islam any more than a Christian terrorist speaks for Christianity. And the real voices of our faiths will be—must be—heard.”

The effort has required reaching out to some “fringe elements.” Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a fiery and radical tele-cleric who has his own show on the Al Jazeera satellite network, was one of the “opinion-leaders” who attended an Amman Message conference in Jordan this summer. In July 2004, according to a translation provided by the indispensable Middle East Media Research Institute, Qaradawi declared that there could be no dialogue between Muslims and Jews “except by the sword and the rifle.”

I'm guessing that's not what Abdullah meant by “tolerance.” So I sought clarification from one of his religious advisers. Joseph Lumbard is an American-born scholar with a Ph.D. from Yale. His title is “Special Adviser to His Majesty for Interfaith Affairs.” I asked him what Qaradawi would think of the king's speech to Jewish leaders.

Silence, followed by a short chuckle. “We constructed that speech with people like Qaradawi in mind,” says Lumbard. “When we rehearsed the speech, we tried to anticipate their objections.” As an example, Lumbard directed me to a passage from the Koran (2:62) that King Abdullah included in his speech:

Truly those who believe and those who are Jews, and the Christians and the Sabeans—those who believe in God and the last day and do righteous deeds, they shall have their reward from their Lord and no fear shall be upon them, nor shall they sorrow.

After reading this passage, King Abdullah challenged those like Qaradawi who claim that the verse has been abrogated, citing “the oldest and most famous of Koranic scholars, al Tabari,” who has apparently said that it has not.

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I don't know enough to know who is right. But that strikes me as a secondary matter. More important is that such a high-level public debate is taking place at all. We have heard for years now that long-term success in defeating terrorists would come only after prominent Muslims themselves challenged the radical ideologues who preach violence. This is that fight.

On September 17, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf joined the rhetorical battle. Musharraf, whose regime has provided steady but sometimes tentative support for the war on terror, addressed the American Jewish Congress in New York City. Musharraf promised to speak candidly. "There is no longer any time for ambivalence or leisurely diplomacy," he said. He did not disappoint. "It is a fact that, today, most of those involved in terrorist acts, as well as most of those who suffer the consequences of these acts, are Muslims. Obviously, there is a deep disturbance and malaise within Islamic societies, which has become especially acute in recent years." Musharraf proposed "enlightened moderation" as the way to "end extremism."

His speech emphasized those things that Jews, Christians, and Muslims have in common; parts of it sounded as if they might have been written for George W. Bush. Musharraf acknowledged the Holocaust and called it the "greatest tragedy" of the Jewish people. He noted that Jewish groups led the opposition to ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia and spoke out against anti-Muslim violence after 9/11.

Five years ago, Musharraf's intelligence services supported Osama bin Laden, who described it as a religious duty of Muslims to kill Americans and Jews, soldiers and civilians, wherever they were found. Today, Musharraf quotes from *Schindler's List* in a speech to prominent American Jews, seeks full diplomatic relations with Israel, and works with Americans to capture and kill al Qaeda terrorists.

Even allowing for the possibility that this may all be in some respects a sophisticated P.R. campaign, it certainly has the feel of progress. ♦

Our Men in Havana

The thankless job of promoting democracy in Cuba. **BY DUNCAN CURRIE**

Coral Gables, Florida

FIDEL CASTRO is not known for his subtlety. So when Cuba's state-run TV dove headfirst into the comic-satire pool last winter, the results were predictably ham-fisted. A brief cartoon introduced Cubans to "Transition Man," a quirky-looking bloke in a pink gown and carrying a magic wand. On the show, which still airs, Transition Man seeks to reverse the Castro revolution's accomplishments in such areas as medicine, education, and race. Once this pesky avatar of Yanqui imperialism loses his wizard garb, he's revealed to be a rat.

The real-life Transition Man—and the cartoon's inspiration—is James Cason, the career Foreign Service officer who recently capped a three-year term as chief of mission at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana (our de facto embassy). Speaking to an audience at the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies on September 12, Cason holds up a picture of his animated alter ego.

"Dictatorships are not good at humor," he says wryly. "We've heard stories of [Cuban] children on buses pretending they were me, incanting 'Cachan, Cachan' as they waved imaginary wands to magically obtain some scarce object. I don't think this was the regime's intent."

Cason leaves Cuba a minor celebrity—"an icon of dissent," as he puts it. The Cuban government brands him a "provocateur" and much worse. The exiles here in South Florida, of course, see things differently.

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His plucky support for Cuba's democracy movement has made Cason a hero to the likes of Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart, two Miami-area Republicans. Ros-Lehtinen calls Cason "a true freedom fighter," while Diaz-Balart hails his "imagination and courage."

Cason's work with Cuban democrats built on the efforts of his predecessor, Vicki Huddleston. He traveled widely around the island (until Castro confined him to Havana), meeting with Cubans of all stripes, and made the U.S. mission a haven for dissidents and independent journalists, a place where they could watch CNN en Español, TV Martí, and other foreign media. The mission dispensed thousands of books and shortwave radios, and even some laptops and printers, in accordance with the Bush policy of aiding Cuba's opposition and promoting civil society.

But Cason went a step further. He's best known for the creative stunts he used to throw the floodlights on Cuban tyranny: the replica of a famous political prisoner's isolation cell he placed in the backyard of his residence; the time capsule he and some dissidents buried, filled with literature and messages to be read on the eve of Cuba's first democratic election; the massive neon "75" he displayed last Christmas to signify the 75 activists locked up by Havana in a 2003 clampdown.

In response to that last escapade, Cuban authorities threw up a gigantic billboard across the street depicting the hooded detainees at Abu Ghraib. It bore a huge swastika, while a nearby mural portrayed a swastika-sporting "Corporal" Cason

dropping bombs on Cuban children.

"For weeks" afterward, Cason says, the regime "literally blasted us with revolutionary music." But he feels he won the Christmas spat, since media coverage reminded the world—and ordinary Cubans—of Castro's prisoners. Nor was Cason deterred by Havana's retaliation. His Fourth of July reception this year, attended by hundreds of Cubans, featured a three-story Statue of Liberty holding a "75" in place of a torch.

"I discovered that symbols were the most compelling means of conveying the repressive nature of the Castro regime," Cason explains. "Symbols also catch the attention of the international media, and they get filtered back into Cuba through photos, illegal Internet access, contraband satellite dishes, and TV Martí."

Perhaps Cason's chief innovation has been the use of video conferences to connect Cubans with foreigners. Last March, three well-known oppositionists—Félix Bonne, Marta Beatriz Roque, and René Gómez Manzano—testified via videolink before Congress and answered members' questions in real time. Cason is "particularly proud" of this new tool.

He's also bullish on the prospects for a transition. "Castro's rickety system cannot last much longer," he says. "Change is inevitable." Nevertheless, he expects Cuba's first post-Fidel government to be some sort of military junta.

That seems the consensus among Cuba watchers. As American Enterprise Institute scholar Mark Falcoff points out, "The regime is already morphing into a kind of military dictatorship. The army is much more important than the Communist party." The armed forces even run Cuba's prized tourism industry. Falcoff, author of the magisterial *Cuba: The Morning After*, sees post-Fidel Cuba evolving into a "military-entrepreneurial" structure not unlike Somoza's Nicaragua or Trujillo's Dominican Republic, in which the ruling autocracy maintains close ties with foreign businesses.

"I think we have to be realistic,"

says Falcoff. The hope is that post-Fidel Cuba will take a liberal democratic page from, say, post-Soviet Poland. But the operative model may well be post-Mao China. Rumors persist that Raúl Castro, Cuba's military boss and heir apparent, favors the Chinese template of embracing capitalism within an authoritarian political system. Fidel disavows any such plan; he has even curbed the timid free-market reforms of the 1990s. But some future strongman could survey the island's basketcase economy and decide to become Cuba's Deng Xiaoping.

As for the U.S. embargo, Cason still supports it, believing it will afford leverage during Cuba's eventual transition. But an influential chunk of Cuban dissidents, led by Oswaldo Payá, don't.

This gets to another harsh reality of

Cuba's plight: Despite Cason's gutsy efforts, the opposition remains divided and querulous. Last May, for example, Payá boycotted the historic meeting of Marta Beatriz Roque's pro-democracy assembly, then slammed Roque for her warm relations with the Miami exiles. Such squabbles ensure that Castro has little to fear, at least for now, from Cuba's civil society types.

Nor, really, did he ever have much to fear from Cason in the short run. As Cason puts it, the U.S. mission plays David to Castro's Goliath security forces. Still, Cason, who's been nominated as ambassador to Paraguay, bequeaths a considerable legacy to his successor, veteran diplomat Michael Parmly. "Promoting democracy in Cuba is not a sprint," says the outgoing U.S. envoy, "but an ongoing relay race." Indeed it is—and Cason carried the baton with flair. ♦

An Offer They Could Refuse

Why Detroit teachers' unions spurned a \$200 million donation. **BY HENRY PAYNE**

Detroit ROBERT THOMPSON wanted to give away \$200 million to help children escape some of America's worst public schools. But for three years the successful businessman turned education philanthropist suffered the wrath of Michigan's Democratic establishment for his politically incorrect charter-school proposal. Then finally in August, Thompson found an ally willing to accept his charity. The nonprofit Skillman Foundation will join him in creating the first of 15 planned charter high schools in Detroit. The schools' goal is a "90/90

system"—that is, a graduation rate of 90 percent (up from the city's current 50 percent) and a college admission rate of 90 percent.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans has become a metaphor for what *Newsweek* calls the "enduring shame" of American poverty. Embraced by Democratic politicians and their allies in the media, this "other America" exists, we're told, because of Republican tax cuts, corporate greed, and a political system that rewards the wealthy at the expense of the poor.

But in Detroit—a sister city to New Orleans in its black cultural heritage as well as in high poverty and crime—the experience of Robert Thompson reflects a very different

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reality. Here, rich “conservative” businessmen are acutely aware of America’s underprivileged and have been rushing expensive, progressive solutions to the sinking inner city. Blocking the doorway, however, are the very “liberal” institutions that claim to be advocates of the poor.

For thirty years, Detroit has been hemorrhaging population as a result of high crime, high taxes, soaring insurance rates—and a crumbling system of public education, which has left Detroit’s adult population with a staggering rate of functional illiteracy (47 percent, according to the federal government’s National Center for Education Statistics). This leaves a shallow employment pool for any enterprise looking to locate in the city.

Seeking educational alternatives, state Republicans—against fierce opposition from teacher unions and Democrats—succeeded in passing legislation in the 1990s authorizing charter schools. These public schools are governed independently of local school boards; each is sponsored by a city or a university, and most are nonunion and have a distinctive educational approach. Since then, 39 charter schools have opened in Detroit, yet the number of Detroit families on charter waiting lists is estimated in the thousands. Moreover, most charter schools serve grades K through 6 (elementary schools are the cheapest to build), which leaves a crying demand for high schools.

In 2002, Republican governor John Engler answered parents’ pleas for aid with a push to bring 15 more charters to Detroit. Enter Robert Thompson.

A Michigan farm boy who later taught school in Detroit, Thompson went on to found the state’s biggest asphalt paving company, working out of the Detroit suburb of Plymouth. When he sold his company in 1999 for \$461 million, he and his wife, Ellen, created the Thompson Foundation, dedicated to helping Detroit’s poor. They first funded University Preparatory Academy, a

successful K-12 charter school with a 90/90 system that is the model for the high schools Thompson now wants to build.

Thompson credits his own success to the education he received, and he is determined to give Detroit’s poor the same opportunities. “The only way to get those kids out of there is through education,” says the soft-spoken Thompson.

In Detroit, officials reacted to Thompson’s proffered \$200 million not with gratitude but with rage. The Michigan Federation of Teachers urged a walkout, declaring a school holiday so that union members could march on the state capitol in protest of charter schools. State Democrats cowered before the union, while Detroit’s politicians bristled at a white suburbanite’s “meddling” in the city’s affairs. Detroit mayor Kwame Kilpatrick—whose own children attended a charter school—responded to Thompson’s offer by saying, with a dismissive wave of the hand, “Let us make the rules, and if he can’t abide by the rules . . .”

Says Thompson, “We thought if we tried to do good things, people would appreciate it. I guess we were naive.” Shunned and saddened, Thompson withdrew his offer in October 2003.

Yet he persevered. “I thought, How can you change the world a little bit?” he says. “You can’t let those kids down. You’ve got to figure out how to do this.”

The breakthrough came in March 2005, when he received a call from another rich businessman with a passion for Detroit’s poor: ex-Pistons basketball star Dave Bing.

Bing, an African American, later told the *Detroit Free Press*, “When I heard how Bob was treated, it just didn’t make sense to me. I knew there was a need. From a selfish standpoint, as a businessperson, I need educated people on my work force. I’m not anti-public schools. But I don’t think they will fix public schools quick enough to stop the

drain. And if parents and children don’t have other options, it’s a lose-lose proposition for both the public schools and the city of Detroit.”

Bing’s color was a powerful political asset for Thompson, and together they approached the Skillman Foundation, a black-run nonprofit that has long worked with Detroit’s public schools. Even so, Bing and Skillman came under immediate fire from Detroit liberals.

A group named the Call ‘Em Out Coalition gave Bing a “Sambo Sell-Out Award” at its annual dinner for partnering with a white businessman. The award was bestowed by Democratic City Council member Sharon McPhail. And the Detroit Federation of Teachers expressed its displeasure with Skillman by threatening to end its cooperation with the foundation on other city school projects.

Nevertheless, under the Michigan charter-school law, the Skillman Foundation can now proceed to implement Thompson’s plan. Detroit’s poor should soon see the benefits of his gift—despite the blindness of the city’s leadership.

If New Orleans is a lesson in the consequences of decades of governance that left too many destitute in the inner city, then Detroit is a lesson in how hard it is to bring reform to such cities. If Democrats continue to favor the interests of unions over those of children, the cycle of poverty will capture another generation in the inner city.

On the other hand, if they wise up, real opportunities for change exist. Across America, Thompson has counterparts, wealthy businesspeople bankrolling urban reform. The likes of Amway’s Dick DeVos (another Michigan multimillionaire), Wal-Mart heir John Walton, businessman Ted Forstmann, GAP founder Don Fisher, and Netflix.com CEO and founder Reed Hastings have given hundreds of millions of dollars to the poor for scholarships and charter schools. After Katrina, cities should find a way to just say yes. ♦

The Left University

How it was born; how it grew; how to overcome it

BY JAMES PIERESON

More than 16 million students are now enrolled in colleges and universities in the United States, the largest number ever. In two years, the figure will exceed 17 million, and it will continue to grow, as the high school graduating class of 2008 will be the largest in history. Today nearly 70 percent of the 18-to-24 age cohort attends college in one form or another, and more than 80 percent of high school graduates do so. College attendance has become a near universal rite of passage for youngsters in our society, and a requirement for entry into the world of middle-class employment.

When this year's freshmen enter the academic world, they will encounter a bizarre universe in which big-time athletics, business education, and rigorous science programs operate under the umbrella of institutions that define themselves in terms of left-wing ideology. This is especially true of the 100 or so elite public and private institutions that are able to select their students from among a multitude of applicants seeking entry, and true also of the humanities and social science departments that define the political and social meaning of the academic enterprise. These students will enter the world of what we may call the left university.

The ideology of the left university is both anti-American and anticapitalist. The left university, according to its self-understanding, is devoted to the exposure of the oppression of the various groups that have been the West's victims—women, blacks, Hispanics, gays, and others that have been officially designated as oppressed groups—and to those groups' representation. This is the so-called "diversity" ideology to which every academic dean, provost, and president must pledge obedience and devotion.

As it happens, the contemporary university is diverse only as a matter of definition and ideology, but not in practice or reality. A recent national survey of col-

lege faculty by Stanley Rothman, Robert Lichter, and Neil Nevitte showed that over 72 percent held liberal and left of center views, while some 15 percent held conservative views. The survey also found that, over time, and especially since 1980, academic opinion has moved steadily leftward as the generation shaped by the 1960s has taken control of academe. In the humanities and social sciences, where political views are more closely related to academic subject matter, the distribution of opinion is even more skewed to the left. Unlike professors in the past, moreover, many contemporary teachers believe it is their duty to incorporate their political views into classroom instruction. Thus students at leading colleges report that they are subjected to a steady drumbeat of political propaganda in their courses in the humanities and social sciences.

The same researchers found that 50 percent of college faculty were Democrats, while just 11 percent were Republicans, which should surprise no one since the diversity ideology that drives the university is the same one that defines the Democratic party. Other researchers have reported even more lopsided distributions. Daniel Klein, an economist at Santa Clara University, found in a national survey of professors that Democrats outnumber Republicans in social science and humanities departments by a ratio of 7 to 1. Meanwhile, college administrators and faculty continue to promote campaigns for cosmetic diversity even as their institutions are becoming more monolithic in the one area academics should care about most—that is, in the area of ideas.

This, then, is the left university. The university, moreover, has formed an informal political alliance with the other liberal and left-wing institutions in our society: Hollywood, public sector labor unions, large charitable foundations, the news media, and, of course, the Democratic party. All are driven by the same doctrine of diversity. These institutions have provided political protection and encouragement for the academy as it has moved steadily leftward.

But there are signs that suggest the days of the left university are numbered, and that the leftist establish-

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ment will soon find itself resisting a new tide of change and reform. To understand why this may be so, it will be useful first to look at the American university over a somewhat longer span of development.

II

For the great part of American history, from the founding of Harvard College in 1636 down to around 1900, colleges and universities played a small role in the economic and political developments that shaped the nation. Through the colonial period and into the early 19th century, when state universities began to be formed, institutions of higher learning were built on a British model, and were founded or controlled by Protestant denominations, usually Congregational, Episcopal, or Presbyterian. The purpose of these institutions was to shape character and to transmit knowledge and right principles to the young in order to prepare them for vocations in teaching, the ministry, and, often, the law. Few thought of these institutions as places where new knowledge might be generated or where original research might be conducted. In England, as in America, research and discovery were sponsored by nonacademic institutions like the Royal Society in London or the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, the latter founded by Benjamin Franklin.

It is true that some of the prominent founders of the nation were greatly interested in the role academic institutions might play under the new government. Many of the leaders of the Revolution and authors of the Constitution had attended one or another of the nine colleges that then existed in the fledgling nation. Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, for example, had studied at Kings College (later Columbia) in New York City, Thomas Jefferson at William and Mary, and James Madison at the College of New Jersey (later Princeton). Franklin had earlier been a founder of the University of Pennsylvania. Jefferson and Madison, in particular, were first exposed during their college years to the ideals of liberty and limited government by studying the works of John Locke, Adam Smith, David Hume, and other leading figures of the British enlightenment. Here, during their college years, they absorbed the philosophy that they later used to shape the institutions of the new nation. But these men understood themselves not as academics or scholars, but rather as members of a

“republic of letters,” to use Jefferson’s phrase. They were broadly learned in history and philosophy, and studied ancient languages and politics in order to apply the lessons of the past to the practical problems of the present.

Jefferson, however, perhaps because of his own academic experience, was much taken with the idea of a university that would prepare the young to enter such a “republic of letters,” and to take their place as wise leaders of the real American republic. He understood, as did Madison, that the new republican order they had helped to establish required academic institutions that were more secular and philosophical and less religious and vocational than those existing at the time. During their presidencies, both Jefferson and Madison proposed the creation of a national university with precisely this aim, but such proposals went nowhere in Congress because

many believed that the security of the republic was based more in the design of our institutions and the temper of the people than in the education of a class of leaders—a point that Madison himself had made during the debates over the Constitution. In his later years, therefore, Jefferson turned his energies to the creation of the University of Virginia, which he conceived as the prototype for a new “republican” university,

one that would enroll the best students in his state and provide them with a secular education in the languages and history of Greece and Rome, the practical sciences, and the correct understanding of the Constitution. He lived to see his dream realized when he attended the inaugural banquet (along with Madison and Lafayette) in 1824, two years before he died.

But Jefferson’s vision of a new university for a new republican polity was stillborn. The sharpening sectionalism of the nation from the 1830s onward, and its increasing preoccupation with slavery and expansion, undermined the Jeffersonian ideal of a “republic of letters” that transcended geography, personal backgrounds, and narrow interests. The emerging Jacksonian culture that celebrated equality and the common man, so well described by Alexis de Tocqueville in *Democracy in America*, was likewise suspicious of an institution that appeared impractical and aristocratic. Andrew Jackson and his followers ridiculed the idea of a national university as undemocratic and an affront to the common man. Pioneer democracy, as it was called, was notoriously suspicious of expert wisdom. Thus, as new colleges were established in this era, most were

Jefferson was much taken with the idea of a university that would prepare the young to enter a “republic of letters.”

guided by vocational objectives rather than by Jeffersonian ideals.

During most of the 19th century, therefore, academic institutions operated at some distance from the swirling economic and political events that were transforming the nation. They had little to do, for example, with the Protestant revivals of the 1820s and 1830s, with Jacksonianism or the abolitionist movement, with the emergence of the Republican party, with secession in the South, with the rise of industry after the Civil War, or, even, with major intellectual movements such as Transcendentalism. The great entrepreneurs of the era, such as Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, or George Pullman, were self-made men with little or no academic experience. Two of the most important presidents of the century—Jackson and Lincoln—had little formal schooling at all. Colleges hosted no activities, such as athletic contests or celebrity speeches, that would have brought them to the attention of the wider public. Their exclusive focus on teaching meant that their influence could not reach beyond local circles, and also that there could not develop any center or hierarchy to the academic enterprise. At the close of the Civil War, therefore, academic institutions had but a marginal place in American life.

III

Laurence Veysey, in *The Emergence of the American University*, describes how the modern academic enterprise took shape between the years 1870 and 1910. During this period of reform and invention, colleges and universities began to break their ties to religious bodies, embraced the secular principles of science, progress, and democracy, and adopted the practices of research and academic freedom that define higher education to the present day.

The modern structure of the university, with its division into departments and colleges supervised by a class of administrators, was laid out in these years. It was also during this period that two great innovations—the graduate school and the elective system—were incorporated into the academic enterprise. This was the first of two academic revolutions that created the universities we know today, and which propelled academic institutions into the prominent place they hold in contemporary life.

There occurred a rapid expansion in higher education in the last few decades of the 19th century, encouraged by the end of sectional hostilities, the closing of the frontier, the rise of science and industry, and the accumulation of great wealth in the hands of men prepared

to direct some of it to new academic institutions. From the close of the Civil War to 1890, the number of colleges and universities in the United States doubled from about 500 to 1,000, and the number of students tripled to more than 150,000. By 1910, student enrollment had grown to 350,000. Many of our most influential universities were created during this time, including the University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, Vanderbilt, and Clark—all underwritten financially by wealthy businessmen. The academic revolution of this era was directed and largely implemented by university presidents including Charles Eliot of Harvard, Daniel Coit Gilman of Johns Hopkins, Andrew White of Cornell, William Rainey Harper of Chicago, David Starr Jordan of Stanford—and Woodrow Wilson of Princeton. It was a measure of the esteem in which college presidents were held that Wilson, while president of Princeton, was recruited in 1910 to run for governor of New Jersey and two years later for president of the United States.

The intellectual inspiration and institutional model for this revolution came not from Jefferson and the University of Virginia, or from any American source at all, but from German idealists who brought about an academic revolution in that country in the early 1800s. The institutional model was the University of Berlin, established in 1810 by Wilhelm von Humboldt, Prussian minister of education, under the influence of the idealist philosophers Fichte, Kant, and Hegel, who asserted that the task of the scholar was to search for the truth in science, philosophy, and morals unimpeded by political or religious authorities. The University of Berlin, the original research university, was based on the idea that truth is not something known and passed on, but the subject of persistent inquiry and continuous revision. It incorporated the practice of faculty autonomy in the selection of subjects for research and coursework, and conceived of students as junior partners in the research enterprise, that is, as researchers or professors in training. This new institution thus recast the purpose of the university away from theology, tradition, and vocations and in the direction of science and secular studies. It discarded as well the practice of looking to ancient writers for moral lessons and political guidance. The new university thus placed the faculty rather than students, religious bodies, or public officials at the center of the enterprise, for it was the faculty that in the end would decide what was studied and taught.

The model of the German research university spread rapidly in the United States in the decades after the Civil War, inaugurated by the founding of Johns Hopkins University in 1876 as our first institution organized around graduate research studies. The late scholar Edward Shils

referred to this as “the most decisive single event in the history of learning in the Western hemisphere.” This innovation, as Shils pointed out, put pressure on other institutions to establish their own programs of research and graduate study. Harvard soon created its own Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in order to keep pace with Johns Hopkins. Stanford University was established in 1891 along similar lines, which induced the University of California to follow suit. The University of Chicago, underwritten by John D. Rockefeller, was established in 1892 with research as the basis for faculty appointment and promotion. Other institutions in the Midwest, especially Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois, were then in the process of embracing the research model. Here, then, in the wake of the Hopkins innovation, occurred the first important competition among universities for rank and reputation; and here, through this competition, the modern American university was born.

Shils was certainly correct to emphasize the far-reaching consequences that followed in the United States from the adoption of the German university model. In the United States, as in Germany, the research model transformed the status of the professor from a teacher to an independent scholar and researcher. Professors would no longer pass along established truths and traditional moral ideals, but would subject these truths and ideals to scrutiny in the search for new knowledge. The faculty, as the new priesthood of the research enterprise, would shortly claim authority to decide all matters dealing with curriculum, new faculty appointments, and promotions. The modern doctrine of academic freedom, which gives professors wide latitude to teach and conduct research as they wish, also followed in due course as a consequence of these premises. Much as Oliver Wendell Holmes said that the law is what the judges say it is, the reformed university would henceforth be whatever the faculty decides it is.

As the modern university took shape, faculties began to organize themselves into specialized departments, or disciplines, with their own formal rules for study, research, and publication. It was in this period that the various academic associations were formed, including the American Historical Association (1884), the American Economic Association (1885), the American Physical Society (1899), the American Political Science Association (1903), and the American Sociological Association (1905). These were national membership associa-

tions that held annual conventions and published their own journals containing research studies representing authoritative work in the respective disciplines. These associations were, in a way, national communities that reoriented the attention of professors away from students at their own college and toward colleagues working in the same discipline at other institutions across the country. The status of professors in their various disciplines was based on their published research, which established in turn a new basis upon which to rank departments and entire institutions.

The emergence of the modern university thus created a new class of professional intellectuals—that is, men (and a few women) who worked with ideas for a living. Until this time, intellectual life in America, such as it was, was dominated by ministers and patricians (the Founding Fathers), and then in the 19th century by independent writers who generated income by publishing books and articles. Now for the first time, university professors such as Charles Beard and John Dewey became famous for the books and articles they published. Perhaps it is true, as has been said, that classes of people with a common interest eventually begin to think more or less alike. Certainly this has been true of the professional intellectuals who have populated the American university.


Much as Oliver Wendell Holmes said that the law is what the judges say it is, the reformed university would henceforth be whatever the faculty decides it is.

IV

Humboldt, and Kant as well, were continental liberals in the old sense of that term, sympathetic to liberty and reason and to the Enlightenment critique of religion, theology, and tradition. It is in this sense that we can refer to their academic innovation as a “liberal” university, as it was based on reason, science, free inquiry, and the pursuit of new knowledge.


The new university, devoted to creating new knowledge and questioning old truths, was bound to form a frictional relationship with an American polity that was also liberal but shaped by a different and somewhat conflicting intellectual tradition. The American Revolution and Constitution were grounded in the writings of Scottish and English thinkers of the 18th century, but the modern university was shaped more by continental ideas arising out of Germany and France. Harvard historian Morton White wrote in *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* that many of the intellectual leaders of the university revolution were sharp critics

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
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of the Scottish Enlightenment and the tradition of British empiricism. These figures—Dewey in philosophy, Thorstein Veblen in economics, Charles Beard and James Harvey Robinson in history, Holmes in law—asserted that the philosophical ideas of the British Enlightenment were too abstract, were not grounded in experience, and could not address the concrete problems of modern life. Many, especially Dewey and Robinson, arrived at these judgments through exposure to the German school of historical thought originating with Hegel, which emphasized culture and historical evolution as the keys to understanding society and politics.

It was from this standpoint that Veblen and other economists rejected Adam Smith and classical political economy, that Dewey attacked David Hume, that Beard and Robinson criticized traditional narrative historians who failed to connect the past to the problems of the present, and that Holmes attacked legal theorists who thought that the words of the Constitution answered all questions about the law. These thinkers were not only academics, but products of the new university: Dewey and Veblen had studied together as graduate students (along with Woodrow Wilson) at Johns Hopkins, and Robinson earned a doctorate in history in Germany at the University of Freiburg. All save for Holmes, who was not an academic, concluded that the Constitution, and the philosophy behind it, was inadequate to the challenges of modern life. This led them to search for new intellectual foundations for politics, history, economics, law, and (in Dewey's case) education.

It was through these theories that the modern university laid the intellectual groundwork for political Progressivism and the reorientation of liberal doctrine in the direction of state regulation and reliance on nonpartisan experts. In many circumstances, universities provided more than just philosophical and theoretical ammunition. The first large-scale experiment with progressive policies occurred in the early 1890s, when the University of Wisconsin offered its research services to the governor and legislature of the state. The "Wisconsin idea," as it came to be called, and which served as a model for other institutions to emulate, envisioned a partnership under which the university would provide information, statistics, and technical expertise to the state so that effective and intelligent legislation might be enacted. More than this, as the historian Frederick Jackson Turner argued, the university would train

experts who might serve as judges and commissioners who could mediate in disinterested ways between contending economic interests—for example, between business and labor. Though the university was meant to serve a nonpartisan role, the underlying objective of the enterprise was to bring big business to heel through legislation and regulation, which was understood soon enough by business leaders in the state. This nonpartisan aspiration was genuine, however, since the Progressive agenda had not yet found a home in either political party, and would not do so until the 1930s, when progressives settled for good into Franklin D. Roosevelt's Democratic party.

The Wisconsin idea brought out into the open a new role for the university, which was to bring experts and expert knowledge into the political process. This was one of the clearest links between the emerging university and the progressive movement, since the university

was the logical source for the experts needed to design and implement progressive policies. As time passed, more and more universities established research centers on the Wisconsin model, which eventually led to the creation of public policy schools and an entire profession of academic public policy experts. This development in turn led to a new disjunction in American political life. For the 80 or so years from the formation of the union to the close

of the Civil War, the theorists who designed institutions and policies were one and the same with the political leaders who put them into place. This was true of Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton, and also of subsequent figures, such as Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, and Abraham Lincoln. With the rise of the university, political theories and programs were increasingly devised by academics, like Dewey, Beard, or the Wisconsin professors, who operated outside the arena of electoral politics and whose experience was of a far different kind. The reliance on experts introduced into liberal ranks a permanent ambivalence regarding representative government and the common man—for while the experts purported to act in the name of the people, they also understood that it was a grave risk actually to seek their consent or approval.

It was not coincidental that the modern university emerged at precisely the same time that the modern liberal movement was in the process of defining itself. One might go further to say that for 140 years, from the close of the Civil War to the present day, the fortunes of liber-

The Wisconsin idea brought out into the open a new role for the university, which was to bring experts and expert knowledge into the political process.

alism in America have been intertwined with those of the university, and that important changes in the one have been accompanied by parallel and consistent changes in the other. Looking back over this period, therefore, it appears that liberalism as we knew it in the 20th century originated with the emergence of the modern university.

V

During the following fifty or so years, from 1910 into the 1960s, the American academic system continued to evolve according to patterns that were established during this formative generation. The research university, supported heavily by public funds, expanded exponentially. The gulf grew between research universities and the smaller liberal arts college. Faculty governance was institutionalized. The elective system was applied more or less universally, leading to debates about the “core” curriculum and concerns that specialization and the emphasis on expert knowledge had gone too far. A college degree was viewed by students and parents alike as a key requirement for professional employment and upward mobility. By the 1960s, public officials and academic leaders were nearly unanimous in the view that a college education should be made available to all.

From the 1920s through the 1950s, many leading institutions, Columbia and Harvard prominent among them, made sustained efforts to leaven the new emphasis on specialization and expertise with broader curricula in the arts, humanities, and social sciences—as these fields came to be called when the universities turned in a secular direction. Jefferson’s ideals regarding his “republic of letters” were thus not completely abandoned in the modern university. Columbia established its widely emulated courses in “contemporary civilization” in the 1920s in an effort to expose students to the great literature of Western civilization dating back to the ancient Greeks, and to give them (in the wake of the world war) a more general understanding of how modern institutions came into being. Following World War II, the Harvard faculty sought to combat specialization with its core curriculum in General Education, which included broad courses in science, history, literature, and American democracy. These thoughtful innovations provided a counterweight of sorts to the progressive emphases on expertise and political reform; moreover, they provided intellectual weight to the academic enterprise itself by linking it to the American past and to the civilization out of which the nation and the university evolved.

By 1965, the American university was probably at a high point in terms of public esteem. Academic scientists had played a leading role in the discoveries that had led to victory in World War II. Veterans returning from the war enrolled in colleges and universities in large numbers, contributing a sense of maturity and seriousness to the academic enterprise that it had lacked before (and has lacked since). Professors in all fields, including the arts and humanities, enjoyed wide prestige. College sports reached large audiences through national television broadcasts. The baby boom generation, the largest in the history of the nation, was about to enter university life, causing a more than doubling of enrollments (from 3.5 million to 8 million) between 1960 and 1970.

It is plain in retrospect that the American university changed as fundamentally in the decade or so after 1965 as it did in those formative years between 1870 and 1910. The political and cultural upheavals of the period, spurred by the civil rights movement and opposition to the war in Vietnam, combined with the demographic explosion, brought about a second revolution in higher education, and created an institution (speaking generally) that was more egalitarian, more ideological, and more politicized, but less academic and less rigorous, in its preoccupations than was the case in the preceding era. It was in this period, from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, that the left university emerged in place of the liberal university.

VI

The major changes or reversals that took place in a short period of time were unprecedented in the history of American education: single-sex colleges all but disappeared; college regulation of student morals disappeared as well; government regulation of employment expanded, putting pressure on institutions to hire women and minorities for faculty positions; the line between teaching a subject matter and advocating political positions was blurred or even eliminated altogether as the new campus radicalism asserted that all teaching is political in nature; the liberal underpinnings of academic culture—the freedom to teach and conduct research—were attacked and eroded in the name of political correctness; the unifying character of the humanities was subverted and discredited when they were said to represent an oppressive tradition formed by white European males; new fields, usually with ideological preconceptions, were created outside the traditional departments and areas of study, thus expanding the positions available for radical faculty; serious academic

requirements, including foreign language proficiency, were softened or eliminated. Faculty opinion, already skewed in a liberal direction in the 1950s and 1960s, moved decisively to the left. All of these changes were blasted into place in the tumultuous decade from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, and were institutionalized in the decades that followed.

In many important ways, the left university reversed or modified the assumptions and practices of the liberal university. The architects of the liberal university were optimistic about the prospects for the nation, and looked ahead to the progressive advancement of democracy and liberty, but the leaders of the left university are dour and pessimistic and view our history as a tale of oppression. The liberal academics believed in progress through the application of reason and knowledge, but the academic left asserted that reason and knowledge were masks for corporate or conservative interests. Yet, while the old liberals carved out a role in politics for experts and expert knowledge, the left disdained expertise and embraced the doctrine of diversity, which is based on the naked assertion of group interests. The liberals believed in academic freedom for all, but the academic leftists support academic freedom only for themselves, not for conservative or moderate faculty, not for speakers who disagree with them, and not for students who wish to learn from a nonideological standpoint. The liberals of a century ago took over the university with an intellectual vision grounded in 19th-century philosophy, while the radicals of our time seized control through politics and political pressure by organizing demonstrations and protests and by shrewdly leveraging assistance from governmental regulatory bodies.

There was, in addition, a powerful countercultural element in the left university that was never a significant dimension of the liberal university. While liberals had pressed for practical reforms in American capitalism and the Constitution, the radicals of the 1960s went further to launch a wholesale attack on American culture and the middle-class way of life, which they condemned as repressive and, worse, boring. The cultural radicalism of the 1960s, derived from the Beats of the 1950s, was so appealing to the new campus left because it promised something beyond political reform—namely, a different way of life with a revised set of morals, new styles of dress, and an alternative to conventional careers. The cultural radicalism of the Beats was thus imported more or less wholesale to the campus, which was in turn conceived as a sanctuary from the moral repression of middle class life, a place where any number of different lifestyles might be explored. In the past, Americans in search of bohemia, or a refuge from

middle-class expectations, had fled to communes in the country, or to European outposts as Hemingway and other writers did in the 1920s, or to Greenwich Village or San Francisco, but now they found homes on the modern campus.

There were some obvious weaknesses in the liberal university that the radicals were able to exploit in executing their takeover. The leaders who built the liberal university a century ago erected a set of effective defenses against attacks coming from the outside world—from conservative businessmen, trustees, and donors who disagreed with the political views of professors or from legislators or politicians who sought to punish universities for the unconventional views of some faculty. As things turned out, the protections of academic freedom were much less effective in dealing with internal attacks from organized students and left-wing faculty who disrupted classes, picketed faculty homes and offices, took over administration buildings, issued threats to faculty and administrators, and generally used the tactics of street politics to take over the university.

The liberals never anticipated a revolt from within their own family, and did not know how to respond to it without betraying cherished beliefs about rational discourse and authority legitimized by achievement. The liberals, moreover, invited the contempt of the radicals by erecting a comprehensive critique of American capitalism and the Constitution, based on theories developed from the Progressive Era forward through the 1950s, but then by failing to accomplish anything significant in the way of real change—a failure that made them appear ineffective and weak. So liberalism was wide open to the assault from the left, and within a few years, liberalism—and the university—had been recast as a doctrine of identity politics, group rights, and diversity. It also happened that liberalism was quickly discredited in the eyes of most Americans when it associated itself with these ideas, and that the Democratic party declined into minority status once it had embraced them. Such consequences reveal something instructive about the doctrines that took over the American university.

VII

So the American university went through two major revolutions in the past century, the first driven by ideas of progressive reform, and the second by radical preoccupations with cultural change. The first revolution created the liberal university and the second the left university. Both were far-reaching in the sense that they contributed to a reformulation of liberal

or leftist doctrine and were thereby linked to broader movements for political reform. The left university has now been in place for more than a generation. Are there signs that another revolution is in the offing, one that will move the academy in a more constructive direction?

Consider, for example, the important developments of the past generation that academics in thrall to left-wing doctrines did not foresee and do not understand. There was, first of all, the fall of communism and the Soviet Union, both of which were said by academic experts to be in good shape until the very day they collapsed. There followed equally anomalous events as first socialism and then the welfare state were discredited at the same time that the market revolution gained force in Central Europe and Asia. The emergence of the United States as the world's sole superpower confounded international relations experts who were convinced that a multipolar world was in the making or, alternatively, that the Communist and capitalist systems would eventually converge at some point close to the Swedish welfare state. The passionate interest around the world in liberty as conceived by Locke, Adam Smith, and the American Founders is perhaps the most puzzling development to the left academics because they have so little sympathy with it. In the domestic policy arena, academic experts claimed for thirty years that welfare programs were in no way implicated in urban poverty, crime, family breakup, and teen pregnancy—ideological views that were discredited by the success of the welfare reforms of the 1990s. Nor could academics, committed as they are to secular doctrines, foresee or understand the recent rise of fundamentalist religion around the world. Step by step, the outside world is systematically debunking the ideological prejudices of the left academy.

But the above is just the beginning of an extended catalog of errors, illusions, and misconceptions. For a generation now, universities have promoted research and coursework in something called “multiculturalism,” a doctrine that purports to encourage study of foreign societies and cultures. After the terrorist attacks in 2001, however, we quickly learned that the nation had trained few specialists who understood the Arabic language or Islamic cultures and who might help us understand and counter this new threat. It turned out that multiculturalism was not at all about studying foreign cultures and languages, since this requires real effort, but rather

about mobilizing various national groups to exert political influence within the United States. In terms of content, “multiculturalism” was every bit as hollow as “diversity.”

And if it is true that the United States is in the midst of a moral counterrevolution that seeks to repair much of the cultural damage done by the excesses of the 1960s, then here, too, the universities are out of step. Rates of divorce and illegitimate birth are declining, urban crime is down from the epidemic levels it reached a few decades ago, teen drinking and drug use are declining, and various other measures of cultural vitality are showing signs of similar improvement. All of this suggests a rejection of the kind of antinomianism that took over the academy in the 1960s, and a reassertion of the enduring strength of middle-class ideals.

The academics have thus been wrong—and far wrong—about the most important developments of our time. From their point of view, as Yogi Berra said, “the future is not what it used to be.” To a great degree, university faculties outside the sciences have lost the capacity either to understand or to influence the outside world. Their place is increasingly being taken by private research centers and independent scholars in closer touch and in greater sympathy with these new developments. Centers like the Manhattan Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Hoover Institution have had far more influence in the public policy arena in recent decades than all the academic public policy schools combined. Various independent magazines and journals, such as the *New Criterion*, *Commentary*, and the *Hudson Review*, have seized intellectual leadership from the academy in the arts, humanities, and public affairs. The most prominent historians writing today are nonacademics like David McCullough and Ron Chernow, who, along with benefactors like Richard Gilder and Lewis Lehrman, have done far more than any academic historian to revive the study of American history. The academy is losing influence today because a generation ago it placed a wager on the radical ideas of the 1960s—a wager that it has now lost.

Furthermore, the failures of the left university, along with the excesses of some of its representatives, are gradually leading trustees and donors, and even some presidents and deans, to ask some long overdue questions about the path their institutions have followed. How, for example, can any university carry out its responsibilities

To a great degree, university faculties outside the sciences have lost the capacity either to understand or to influence the outside world.

if all faculty members think the same way, if genuine debate over vital questions is discouraged, if ideological rhetoric crowds out thoughtful discussion, if students know more about the peace movement than the Constitution and more about Ward Churchill than Winston Churchill?

Two decades ago, when Allan Bloom published his bestselling book *The Closing of the American Mind*, he was one of the few articulate voices calling attention to the destructive assumptions of the left university. Today, by contrast, there are numerous initiatives on and off the campus that not only diagnose the problem but also point to practical remedies. Indeed, there are now dozens of organizations promoting intellectual rigor and pluralism on the campus.

College and university trustees are beginning to break through the artificial barrier that says that only faculty are qualified to pass judgment on matters of curriculum and appointments. Earlier this year, for example, the alumni of Dartmouth College elected to its board of trustees two insurgent candidates who ran on a platform that called for intellectual diversity and higher academic standards on the campus. Trustees of the University of Colorado, disgusted by the Ward Churchill fiasco and what it implied about the intellectual standards at their institution, have gone further by creating a new undergraduate program in Western civilization. Trustees

at the State University of New York and George Mason University in Virginia, encouraged by the Washington-based American Council of Trustees and Alumni, have also acted to bolster academic standards in Western civilization and American history. Several years ago the trustees of the City University of New York, alarmed by the collapse of standards that followed a radical takeover a generation ago, took steps to strengthen standards for admission and to incorporate real substance into the curriculum. Trustees elsewhere, encouraged by such examples, are discovering that, if their institutions are to be rescued, they dare not rely on faculties to do it.

Legislators and public officials are also taking a look at possible actions in response to growing concerns about trends on campus. Thus, in response to concerns that anti-Semitic acts on campus have been fueled by Middle Eastern Studies programs receiving federal support, Congress is now considering legislation to strengthen oversight of such grants—and to strip institutions of support where such abuses are found. And, responding to similar concerns, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recently

announced that it will look into the scandal of campus anti-Semitism.

At the same time, some philanthropists have begun to see a connection between anti-Americanism on campus and other pathologies, particularly anti-Semitism, anti-Israelism, racial separatism, and hostility to business. They are surely right to see a connection among these malignancies, and right also to see that they need to be attacked as strands of a broad ideology that has found a home in the left university. Such donors, once they are in the field, will bring a new urgency to the challenge of dislodging this orthodoxy from the academy.

Perhaps the most promising development on campus in recent years has been the creation of various centers and programs dedicated to the study of political liberty and the history of free institutions—for example, the James Madison Program on American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton, the Gerst Program at Duke, the Salvatori Center at Claremont McKenna College, the Political Theory

Project at Brown, and the Center for Freedom and Western Civilization at Colgate. Such programs have grown out of a collaboration between a handful of donors, often alumni concerned about left-wing trends at their institutions, and conservative and moderate professors concerned that students are learning a great deal about racial and gender identity, but little about the intellectual foundations of their civilization.

Exemplary programs like these could come to exist on every major college and university campus, funded either by private donors or, better yet, out of the vast sums that have accumulated in academic endowments.

These developments represent just the leading edge of a growing movement to challenge the practices of the left university. The purpose of such efforts is not to give representation to conservatives on an equal footing with other campus interest groups. Intellectual pluralism, the search for truth, and respect for the heritage of free institutions are neither conservative nor left-liberal ideals. Jefferson, indeed, understood these ideals to be at the heart of the university, and central to his vision of a “republic of letters”; Humboldt, too, saw his liberal university as the means of carrying forward the principles of liberty, free inquiry, and the unimpeded search for truth. The effort to restore these ideals on campus is thus something that both conservatives and liberals should applaud. The left university should not be replaced by the right university. It should be replaced by the real university, dedicated to liberal education and higher learning. ♦

*Intellectual pluralism,
the search for truth, and
respect for the heritage of
free institutions are
neither conservative nor
left-liberal ideals.*

Stillstand in Deutschland

German voters choose stalemate.

BY CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL

Berlin

Just before the Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel took the stage to address her party's disappointment in Germany's national elections last Sunday, a few young yahoos started chanting her name: "An-gie! An-gie! An-gie!" Soon they had the whole room going. Choreographed enthusiasm is something new in postwar German politics. To most people, it looks like mimicry of an American custom. To Merkel, the daughter of an evangelical pastor who spent her first 35 years in Communist East Germany, it must have looked like something worse. Merkel scanned the crowd and curled her lip into a joyless expression conveying: Are you *through*?

She had plenty to be joyless about. True, Gerhard Schröder's ruling coalition of Social Democrats and Greens had been voted out after seven years in power. True, with 35 percent, Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (including its Bavarian wing, the Christian Social Union) was Germany's largest party. It thus had the first claim to try to form a government. But the CDU had lost dozens of seats. It had been less soundly repudiated than the SPD, but only by a hair's breadth. For the first time since World War II, both big parties were under 40 percent—and they were way under 40 percent. That Merkel would lead the new government was by no means clear. As the evening wore on, Schröder had the effrontery to suggest that he lead it himself.

Only weeks before, Merkel had enjoyed a double-digit lead in the polls and had been cast as the Margaret Thatcher of her generation. Now she had blown an unblowable election. As we go to press, the German parties are deadlocked and unable to form a government, with no consensus on whether to proceed on a course of state reform or to stop it. And an unsta-

ble Germany is a crisis not just for a country but a continent.

Between Slovakia and Egypt

What made the election look like a safe win for the CDU opposition was the steadily worsening quality of life for median Germans. The main problem was that 11 percent of them (19 percent in Berlin) had no jobs. In February, unemployment rose to over 5 million people. That was a record high, but the jobless rate has been in or near double digits since the mid-1990s. Starting with Thatcher's Britain, almost all European countries have fought unemployment through deep and sometimes painful reforms. A quarter-century later, Germany—along with France and Italy—is still holding out.

But Germany has also spent 1.4 trillion euros to rebuild the former East Germany. As the state goes broke, its reputation for high-quality social services wanes. The country had its Sputnik moment in 2003, when the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) ranked the German education system near rock-bottom of 32 developed countries surveyed. To add to the problem, Germans are having children at half the rate they were when the socialist state was built up in the 1950s and 1960s. Since pensions and health care, the most expensive parts of the social system, are pay-as-you-go, battles over the role of the state increasingly pit the old against the young.

Schröder is a campaigning genius. His poll numbers have been at historic lows for most of his seven years in power, except for a few weeks of campaigning in 2002, when he engineered a frenzy of outrage over the impending Iraq war, and won reelection by the narrowest of margins. Non-geniuses in his party have fared less well. After 2002, the SPD lost an unbroken string of state elections. That left 11 of the 16 German states under Christian Democrat-led governments, which can block Schröder's programs in the Bundesrat, the upper house. The breaking point came in May, when the Social Democrats were roundly defeated in North Rhine-Westphalia, the gigantic state around

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Cologne. If you could double the weight of California in American politics, you would get an idea of North Rhine-Westphalia's importance in Germany's. If you could double the average margin of victory for Democrats in California, you would get an idea of its solidity as an SPD stronghold. After the loss, Schröder asked his own party to pass a vote of no confidence against him, so he could call early elections. At this point, Merkel was outpolling him on all issues except two: foreign policy, which is German for Iraq, and "social justice," which is German for welfare.

No one should think—although the CDU tried to leave the impression—that Schröder had just sat on his hands when it came to reforming the state. The problem was the reluctance and the slipperiness with which he did it. While railing against the "Hire-and-Fire Gesellschaft," Schröder implemented it, to a degree. The maximum size of companies in which you could hire and fire at will rose from 7 employees to 10, and then to 20. The man who had given a blunt *nein* to what he called "American conditions" was doing something to create them. In early 2004, he had called for the creation of elite universities on the American model; student loans would put the onus of payment on the credential-obtainer, not the working-class taxpayer. That archetypal figure of post-1968 Germany—the fully subsidized 36-year-old "student"—was becoming a thing of the past.

And Schröder linked unemployment benefits to work. When his plan to cut employer copayments and the duration of benefits unleashed bitter weekly protest marches in 2004, particularly in the East, he held his ground. The week before the election, the Washington-based International Finance Corporation ranked Germany among the top handful of reforming economies, between Slovakia and Egypt. German companies, already lean from years of unaffordable labor, have begun to see an increase in foreign investment.

Under such circumstances, Schröder's decision to call early elections—in the pain stage, rather than the eventual gain stage, of his reforms—looks crazy. To use an American analogy, he had chosen to run as the Ronald Reagan of 1982, not 1984; as the Bill Clinton of 1994, not 1996. His timing made it appear as if he didn't believe his reforms would promote prosperity in the first place, as if he thought the global economy could be easily duped with a couple of showy tricks that would leave economic fundamentals intact. Faced with jobless rates that weren't budging, Schröder didn't counsel patience. He turned populist, blaming a set of causes that were all someone else's fault. These causes varied, but the Kosovo war, the attack on the World Trade Center, high oil prices, and the dot-com bubble usually figured among them. This was Merkel's opening. Every European country had gone through all these

things, she noted in speech after speech—Germany, and Germany alone, was hemorrhaging jobs. Schröder's program was an unappealing combination of timidity and scapegoating. "Our difficulties," she said, "are homemade."

Bloodsuckers of the Nation

Even as the working class shrinks, the SPD is still a working-class party. With a few exceptions (such as the novelist Günter Grass), it has not become a preserve of the credentialed upper-crust, the way other Western social democratic parties have. Not only did Schröder's reforms come out of the hide of his own people—the promises he made to defend them from the vicissitudes of a rapacious capitalism were idle ones. The industrial workers of Slovakia and Hungary were now part of the European Union, and could do the work of German labor for a seventh of the cost. At Opel, Siemens, and other companies, unions were negotiating lower benefits, or agreeing to work slightly fewer hours for vastly lower pay.

Gregor Gysi, the leader of the Party of Democratic Socialism (the successor to the East German Communist party), liked to say in his speeches, "There must be logic in politics." Many leftist voters had trouble seeing any. Why, they asked, should Jürgen Schrempp reap a windfall from his stock options when news of his resignation as chairman of Mercedes sent share prices soaring? In effect he'd been paid millions—more, it was alleged, than Mercedes paid in taxes—for doing a bad job. How could 5 million unemployed coexist with a place like the Schlemmermarkt in the Galleria shopping mall in Hamburg, where the entire menu consisted pretty much of lobster, caviar, and champagne, and which was two deep at the bar on weekend afternoons? Other countries had hashed out these questions in the more stable 1980s. Germany was addressing them in an age of global terrorism and political realignment. "Many Germans believe Gysi is right," says Martin Klingst, the political editor of the opinion weekly *Die Zeit*, implying that those who agreed with Gysi far exceeded those who were ready to vote for him. Dozens of books about "unfettered capitalism" clogged the shelves of bookstores. One, by the former television commentator Michael Opoczynski, was called *The Bloodsuckers of the Nation*.

Schröder's quick-election gambit rested on the intuition that his supporters on the German left would not take economic reality lying down, that his only chance to get a positive verdict from the public would come before a broad left-wing opposition could coalesce. He was right. In May, Oskar Lafontaine, Schröder's former finance minister and a onetime SPD candidate for chancellor, defected. He joined the W-ASG, a party of the hard left founded just before the North Rhine-Westphalia debacle. Lafontaine took with

him dozens of important functionaries from the German labor movement. The W-ASG, meanwhile, announced it would join Gysi's post-Communists to form a new force, the Left party.

None of the members of the new party quailed at the question often posed to them: How would they feel about being the Ralph Naders of the German election—shaving off enough Social Democrat votes to make Angela Merkel chancellor? They insisted they hadn't left their party, their party had left them. "We took nothing from the SPD in North Rhine-Westphalia," said Axel Troost, a W-ASG board member, over coffee at an outdoor café in Bremen. "Most of our votes came either from nonvoters or the far right." Troost was not the only one—inside or outside the party—who saw the party as a welcome roadblock in the way of the radical right's recruitment of protest voters. In Saxony, the NPD, Germany's oldest neo-Nazi party, was on the rise. It had developed a grassroots movement, with sports clubs and rock CDs that it handed out in schoolyards. It had taken 9.2 percent of the Saxon vote in September 2004, half a percentage point behind Schröder's SPD, and entered the state parliament.

There was a perceptible drift to the extremes among young people throughout Germany; a Bertelsmann poll in late summer found more than a third (35.3 percent) of teenagers agreed on the need for "a strong hand to once again bring order to our state." Of these, many more described themselves as belonging to the left than to the right. So it was also possible to see the Left party as simply offering a new label under which extremists could pursue their agenda, particularly after Lafontaine gave a speech in July using the word *Fremdarbeiter*, innocent enough in its denotative meaning of "foreign worker," but unknown to German political rhetoric since Nazi times. Schröder attacked Lafontaine late in the campaign for wading in the "brown mire" of Germany's past—the same phrase he'd used to attack the NPD a year before.

On election night, this hard-left force, inexperienced, disorganized, and ostracized by other parties, with much in common on socioeconomic issues with the hard right, outpolled the Greens to become the fourth political party in Germany—and came within a few percentage points of being the third. The parties of the center-left have thus far ruled out any coalition with it.

Sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigungsverhältnisse

Clearly Merkel's election was never in the bag, as it had looked. If Schröder's mild reforms had put the country in such a state, it should have taken more than a few opinion polls to prove that Ger-

mans would vote for a party demanding even more of them. Merkel accused Schröder of "trying to give false facts to scared people." That was not what Merkel planned to do. She was going to lay out her case patiently, honestly—and logically, as befit the physicist she had been when the Wall came down. Merkel had won everything in life not by bamboozling people but by being proved correct. She seemed scrupulously (or arrogantly, depending on how you viewed it) unwilling to win on any other terms, or to bother with the petty superficialities of electioneering. She made herself the anti-Schröder. At their one-on-one debate, with 21 million Germans tuned in, she allowed herself to be filmed at an odd camera angle that made her look squat and strange. At the roundtable debate a week later with all the candidates, she spoke only when spoken to.

It became clear from what she did not say that Merkel was trying to keep the campaign rational and at room temperature. On the issue where German voters agreed with her most—her opposition to Turkish membership in the E.U.—she was almost completely silent. Merkel preferred to discuss, rather numbingly, the rate at which Germany was losing *sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigungsverhältnisse*—the kind of jobs that, through taxes, provided the funds for Germany's starving welfare state. The SPD and Greens, meanwhile, advertised their own pro-Turkey position in Turkish language posters and TV spots. Merkel's avoidance of Turkey was reminiscent of Republicans' avoidance of hot-button issues when running against Bill Clinton in the late 1990s. There are certain campaign weapons that a campaigning genius, a Schröder or Clinton, is certain to turn against their wielders, even if one cannot say exactly how.

Her timidity did not stop Social Democrats from describing Merkel as a "radical" (often after showing their objectivity in the American political style, by praising to the skies those of her predecessors who were either retired or dead). The undercurrent of much criticism was that she was too marked by the Communist East in which she had been brought up—too serious, too earnest, some kind of cipher out of Zamyatin's *We*. It was to contrast Schröder's beery élan with Merkel's reserve that the SPD's most widely posted billboard described the chancellor as "Strong. Courageous. *Menschlich*."

Merkel refused to identify herself as an "East" German—reunification was too important to her for that. The most bitter attack she made at the end of her campaign was on Oskar Lafontaine, because he had "never wanted reunification." But her unwillingness to tell stories about herself was held against her. There was indeed something very Eastern European about Merkel. She was impatient with the cant of the West German holdovers

who still dominated German politics, accusing them, for instance, of favoring criminal rights over victims' rights. She had as much in common with free-market politicians in the Czech Republic and Hungary and Poland as she did with her fellow Germans.

In the course of the campaign, this would become her biggest problem. She was a childless, divorced, Eastern, Protestant woman in a party that was familial, Western, and largely Catholic and male. The powerful governors who had risen in the shadow of Helmut Kohl had all expected to be in the position that she had won through canniness and competence. One got the impression they wished her ill. At an early August rally, the Bavarian governor Edmund Stoiber, head of the Christian Social Union, had badly damaged Merkel with an ex tempore remark. "When I look at the polls," he had said, "I realize that it's actually the biggest losers—Lafontaine and Gysi—who are making the biggest promises, trying to collect the votes of the protest voters of right and left." After wishing the eastern part of the country well, he concluded: "At the end of the day, it's unacceptable that these losers should determine the fate of Germany." Clearly, when he was talking about losers, he meant Gysi and Lafontaine. But people in the East swore he had meant them.

Stoiber may simply have misspoken. But he had also—like many of Merkel's fellow party members—built a career on promising extravagant benefits out of the German welfare state. It was not certain that his own career could survive the reforms Merkel had proposed. Merkel didn't really understand, or have too much in common with, the party she was supposed to represent. That led her into a big mistake.

Merkel's Boner

Merkel got one of the most brilliant tax experts in the country, an apolitical Supreme Court judge in Heidelberg named Paul Kirchhof, to draft a plan for tax reform. It was a flat tax. Kirchhof suggested a 25 percent rate for everyone; this would be a cut for most Germans. He would pay for it by adding 2 percent to the sales tax and closing 418 loopholes in the tax code. You could make the case that this was terrific politics. First, it committed Germany to a path of reform, for, just as in the United States, the flat tax was not only about making taxes fair and transparent. It was also about wiring the state's jaws shut. Second, it showed Merkel as sufficiently bold to carry out reforms in the first place. Third, it put her on the right side of one of Germany's great populist grievances—widespread tax evasion by the very rich, many of whom were able to use those 418 loop-

holes to avoid paying any tax at all. "A complicated tax system," Merkel said, "is an unjust tax system." In the case of Germany, she was right.

Anyone who remembers the fate of Republican flat-tax efforts in mid-1990s will know what happened next: The complexity of the *present* system worked against those who wanted to simplify it. Since figuring out how much one would win or lose in the transition was almost impossible, the popularity of the plan became a matter of atmospherics. This was Schröder's strong suit, not Merkel's. Schröder described the flat tax as the same "for millionaires and bus drivers," and the man who dreamed it up as "that professor from Heidelberg." What happened to your average nurse—with two kids and just as many loopholes—under the plan? *Der Spiegel* ran a study saying that she got tax relief, and those richer than she paid more. The SPD took out ads that proved opposite conclusions. The SPD won the battle, if not the argument. They understood human nature better. It turned out that Germans cherished their loopholes, in accord with the rule that people will happily live under *any* system, as long as they can feel they're outsmarting it, or ripping it off.

In the last days of the election, two of the most influential Christian Democrat governors—Christian Wulff and Roland Koch—disassociated themselves from Kirchhof's plan, claiming it wouldn't work. They succeeded in getting Friedrich Merz, their friend and Merkel's long-time party rival, brought into a prominent role—a campaign shake-up half a week before voters went to the polls. When the result came in, Wulff lamented, "We didn't spread enough hope, courage, and confidence."

But confidence alone would not have done the trick. Germans may have been too mesmerized by their economic predicament to notice it, but from the time the election was called, Schröder had had an ace in the hole. Germany actually had not one big project but two. Alongside his (gingerly) modernization of its welfare state, Schröder had undertaken (with gusto) the modernization of Germany's position in the world. The very youngest Germans to have experienced the Second World War as adults were now moving into their eighties. Germany was no longer a pacifist special case of a country but a middle-sized European power that had fought two wars (Kosovo and Afghanistan) on Schröder's watch, and had 7,000 soldiers stationed around the world. This normalization was inevitable and natural. So was some friction with the United States, which, however benign its motives and however gentle its influence, is the country whose custodianship Germany had to renounce in order to reclaim a normal position in the family of nations. But there were many possible ways of effecting this break. Germans

proved not to like Schröder's attitude towards the welfare state; they *loved* his way of reforming German foreign policy.

That is why Schröder brought foreign policy—almost totally absent from public consideration all summer—roaring into the campaign in its final days. When he referred to Nazism and Stalinism as a means of passing off his largely economic relationship with Putin's Russia as a peace initiative, Schröder was being cynical. But about America he was direct, and clearly speaking from the bottom of his heart. Schröder sought to stoke anti-Americanism in any way he could. The city most often mentioned in the course of the campaign was not Berlin or Hannover but New Orleans, which Schröder and his Green running mates called an example of what would happen to Germany if the CDU were elected. The spectacular scandals at Volkswagen were all over the German press just a few weeks ago, but in addressing the problem of corporate corruption it was Enron to which Schröder referred. He tried to pick a new fight with George W. Bush over the latter's statement that no options were off the table in dealing with Iran's nuclear program. He dusted off his nationalistic applause line from the 2002 race about how Germany's foreign policy decisions would be made "in Berlin and in no other capital."

In one of the more pitiless ad hominem attacks of the campaign, Joschka Fischer, the Green foreign minister, belittled Merkel for having written in the *Washington Post* on the eve of the Iraq war that Schröder did not speak for all Germans. One SPD campaign poster showed the famous 2004 photo of a cargo plane full of coffins draped in the American flag, under the (altogether baseless) sentence "She'd have sent soldiers." It was Iraq and, to a lesser extent, flourishing antiglobalist NGOs such as ATTAC that gave the SPD the most energetic youth wing in the campaign. And it probably hurt Merkel that, at the end of her debate with Schröder, she stole a page from Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign and asked her fellow Germans if they were better off than four years ago.

Formal Grounds

Merkel is a cerebral politician, who tries to convince you she is right. Schröder is an animal politician, who tries to convince you he is stronger. The clash of these two styles was visible on election night, and it has a lot to do with why Germany is spiraling into crisis. Merkel gave a tight smile and admitted she wished she'd done better. Schröder made his trademark Popeye-the-Sailor-Man gesture—clasping both hands over his head and pumping them about as if he were shaking a cocktail. That did not change the fact that

Merkel got more votes, or remove her customary prerogative to lead coalition negotiations. But it seemed to. "Practice humility," Schröder told Merkel and the CDU. "That's the least one can expect from a Christian party." By the end of the week, the SPD was reportedly plotting a parliamentary maneuver to get the votes of the two component parts of the Christian union (CDU and CSU) counted separately. That had never been done in the 60 years since the party system emerged from the war, but it would—post facto—render the SPD the largest vote-getter and give Schröder first crack at forming a government.

On a postelection roundtable with the other candidates, Schröder seemed to argue that he deserved the chancellorship because he'd beaten expectations, even if he hadn't beaten Merkel. "Just take a look at what really caused this electoral turnaround," he said. "Alongside the comparison of policies, there was also a comparison of the people putting them forward. And that's why there can't be any talk whatsoever here about making a claim to power on formal grounds, however much you may want to. That won't be accepted."

It was as if Howard Dean had made his 2004 Iowa rant as he was moving towards getting made president in an election thrown to the House of Representatives. Writing two days later, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* editor Frank Schirrmacher compared Schröder's outburst to those of dictators in Latin American novels. "What did Schröder actually mean by 'formal grounds'?" Schirrmacher asked. "As best we can tell, he meant the election result." Some Germans felt remorse, even a bit of the panic Schirrmacher did, as if they'd woken up hungover after having done something terrible. The percentage of voters who wanted to see Merkel as chancellor rose dramatically; the number who preferred Schröder plummeted. Schröder, they seemed to admit, had looked prettier at closin' time.

Merkel had been described by Schröder, in speech after speech, as a menace to the *soziale Gerechtigkeit* (social justice) that is a core principle of the German social state. Merkel's worldview held that that social justice, whatever its historic virtues, had turned into a mere slogan, one that was doing real harm to society. There is nothing less socially just, she stressed, than mass unemployment, or older people living *auf Pump*—on credit—at the expense of future generations. It was a rational argument, and she was right. But it was precisely Merkel's rationality that made the campaign extremely hard to read, and now makes Germany's predicament so stunning. Nobody can ever really tell whether people have grasped a cogent argument. It's a deep mystery. But any fool, in a hall full of noise and emotion and electricity, can look into the heart of a nation. ♦

Vioxx's Runaway Jury

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You'd think that a reputable company has at least the same chance of a fair trial as an accused murderer. But as the recent Angleton, Texas, jury's verdict against Vioxx shows, you'd be wrong.

The horrible effect of this verdict will be that people like you and me, who badly want medicines to help us with pain or even save our lives, will have fewer options. For instance, Merck's new COX-2 inhibitor, Arcoxia, is available only outside the United States.

Consider the flimsy evidence the Texas jury used to find against Vioxx. First, one clinical trial by Merck showed an elevated risk of heart attack in patients who took heavy doses of Vioxx for at least eighteen months. But Robert Ernst died after taking Vioxx for only eight months. Second, the coroner, Dr. Maria Araneta, found that Ernst died of arrhythmia, or irregular heartbeat, not of a heart attack. It's true that Araneta later reversed herself but in a speculative manner. She testified that it may have been an undetected blood clot that caused his death. Not only did the coroner fail to find the smoking gun, but also, to continue the analogy, she failed to find a bullet.

Consider the consequences for us. Many of us would be willing to sign in a heartbeat, so to speak, a contract with reputable drug companies giving up our right to sue in various circumstances in return for the right to buy promising new medicines. But because the courts are so "concerned" for us, they won't enforce such contracts. As a result, reputable

companies such as Merck know that courts and juries will second-guess them and impose heavy penalties if the companies make decisions that we would gladly have them make but that juries might disagree with after the fact. The cases they subsequently lose could cost tens of billions of dollars.

Merck and other reputable drug companies are likely to respond in two ways to this threat from runaway juries. First, before releasing new drugs, companies will probably be even more cautious. According to the Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development, since the 1960s the total time required for drug development—from synthesis or discovery in the laboratory to delivery to the patient—increased from 8.1 years to 15.2 years. Expect another year or two on top of that. This means that some of us will die or live in pain while companies do studies on thousands of subjects to further reduce the probability that miracle drugs have low-probability side effects.

Second, pharmaceutical companies will develop only clear winners. Medicines that serve small markets or may have some awkward problems will be skipped. Good riddance? Not so fast. Like Vioxx, many of the drugs we rely on, including aspirin, can cause serious side effects. The medicines we will do without are ones that many of us would love to have.

Oh yes, there's another difference between Merck and an accused murderer. No one thinks the murderer was out to help the victim. Merck was.

—David R. Henderson

David R. Henderson, formerly the senior economist for health policy on the President's Council of Economic Advisers, is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and coauthor of Making Great Decisions in Business and Life.

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LA Opinion / Ciro Cesar / East Los Angeles College protest, Columbus Day, 2004



The Cost of Free Speech

In the universities it's almost as high as the tuition

BY HARVEY MANSFIELD

Sensitivity has taken over our society, and nowhere more securely than in our universities.

To see what has happened, consider this small fact. Half a century ago, a liberal Harvard psychologist, Gordon W. Allport, published a book, *The Nature of Prejudice*, that began the social science study of stereotypes. Though of course hostile to stereotypes, he allowed they might have a kernel of truth. For example, he said, fewer Jews are drunks than Irish.

A remark like that could not be made at a university today except in private to trusted friends. And if you made it, you would be testing your trust. Jews and Irish, to be sure, are not protected groups, but to speak so frankly even about them would betray

a very troubling levity in your attitude toward groups that are protected.

Sensitivity is today's version of the soft despotism that Alexis de Tocqueville worried about in democracies, and it would not have surprised him that

Restoring Free Speech and Liberty on Campus
by Donald Alexander Downs
Independent Institute/Cambridge,
295 pp., \$28.99

the worst of it would be found in the halls of the intellect. Only in American universities, some 300 of them, from 1987 to 1992, did the movement for sensitivity go so far as to enact semi-legal speech codes proscribing offensive speech. These codes provoked the ire of a few free speech heroes on the campuses and, more important, prompted them to mobilize opposition

to the codes and to attempts by university administrators to enforce them.

One of these heroes, Donald Downs, a professor at the University of Wisconsin, has written an account of his own successful coup there, together with accounts of a comparable victory at Pennsylvania and failures at Berkeley and Columbia. He accompanies his narratives with reflections, which are those of an old-fashioned free speech liberal. At first a supporter of speech codes, Downs changed his mind when he saw them in operation. Readers get a chance to judge the virtues and defects of the free speech position in trying circumstances when many liberals abandoned it for sensitivity.

During most of the 20th century, Downs says, threats to free speech came from the right and from outside the universities. But in the late 1960s they began to come from the left, and from within. At that time, Herbert

Harvey Mansfield is professor of government at Harvard.

Marcuse set forth his notion of “repressive tolerance,” an attack on the liberal free speech doctrine which claimed that, while pretending to tolerate free speech, liberals actually repressed it. This was because liberals frowned on radicals like Marcuse. Real dissent would have to challenge the whole of liberalism; in fact, the only true dissent is challenging liberalism. Conformist speech defending liberalism is worthless; in fact, so worthless that it can safely be repressed. No, safety demands that it be repressed, and in making a demand, safety is transformed into morality. Morality requires repressing liberalism. Downs calls this “progressive censorship,” and says it is just as detrimental to free universities as traditional censorship from the right.

Thus, “repressive tolerance” has quite a punch in two words. By the late 1980s Marcuse’s thinking had infused liberals and deflected many of them from liberalism into postmodernism, one feature of which is a soft therapeutic notion of sensitivity. Instead of repressing liberalism, let’s make it sensitive. Between the late ’60s and the late ’80s feminism came on the scene and embraced sensitivity as the peaceable, womanly way to victory over liberalism.

Downs’s first case is Columbia, which enacted a “sexual misconduct policy” in 2000 to assuage feminist protest there. Many more rape victims were being treated at Columbia’s hospital than rapists convicted in the university judicial system. Columbia’s solution was to make things easier for the accuser and harder for the accused. This policy related to conduct, and was not professedly a speech code.

At Berkeley, home of the Free Speech Movement of the late ’60s, “progressive social censorship” was applied against opponents of affirmative action (outlawed in California in 1996 by Proposition 209). A series of incidents arising over cartoons in the student newspaper, law school admissions, and protests against visiting speakers created an atmosphere of intimidation, even though it was not formalized in a speech code.

At both universities, intimidation was directed at conservatives. As one Columbia student said, “You can’t be conservative. If you are, you automatically get notoriety and infamy.” Conservatives were not altogether silenced, but they were made to suffer when they spoke up.

At Penn, a harassment code initiated by President Sheldon Hackney was passed in 1987, allegedly covering conduct, not speech. But harassment included stigmatizing speech, as Eden Jacobowitz, a Penn student, found out. In a famous incident in 1993, he shouted “water buffalo” at a group of black sorority women who were disturbing his study, and was then called to account and punished by the university. The conservative Penn historian Alan Kors took up Jacobowitz’s cause and succeeded, after much travail, in exonerating him and getting the code abolished.

In the chapter on Wisconsin, Downs tells the story of his own exploits. In 1989, President Donna Shalala (like Hackney, later a figure in the Clinton administration) established codes for students and faculty that explicitly punished demeaning speech, later called “hate speech.” The student code was abandoned two years later, but the faculty code remained until Downs, a First Amendment liberal, organized its abolition in the faculty senate in 2001. His book tells a harrowing tale featuring a few heroes like himself and Kors (plus William Van Alstyne of Duke, Nat Hentoff of the *Village Voice*, Dorothy Rabinowitz of the *Wall Street Journal*, and civil rights lawyer Harvey Silverglate), a few villains such as Hackney and Shalala, their politically correct administrators, and many easily confused or intimidated faculty liberals.

Downs ends on a note of optimism, urging others to learn from what he and his friends accomplished. One can imagine his dismay at the recent spectacle at Harvard this spring, when progressive social censorship was enforced on President Lawrence Summers by the Harvard faculty. Not only was Summers’s speech on why more women do not enter science rejected in

substance, but his mere choice of topic and call for inquiry into the matter were declared insensitive. In a secret ballot, he was branded as lacking the confidence of Harvard’s bold faculty. Summers, with his apologies for raising the issue, did not, to say the least, react as did Donald Downs. Summers is no Hackney and no Shalala; but still, he was overcome by the forces of sensitivity. Perhaps Downs would not be so hopeful if he were writing with this incident in view.

Let us honor the conscience of free speech liberalism and the passion to defend free speech that it inspires. But let’s also take a look at two problems—balance and truth—arising as liberalism faces the demand for sensitivity.

Downs ends his book remarking that maintaining free speech in universities is a “delicate balancing act,” but he also says that its defenders need to have the “requisite passion.” The trouble is that passion for free speech cools off in the act of balancing. Passionate defense of free speech is attracted to extremes that test the bounds of the First Amendment and require a valiant effort by the defender to tolerate speech he loathes, as in the promise never quite kept by Voltaire to defend to the death the right of a speaker he disapproves of. This is drama rather than balance. Downs himself had written a book in 1985 on the Nazis in Skokie, concluding that, on balance, racial vilification does not deserve First Amendment protection. He changed his mind, he says, because he came to doubt the ability of university administrators to strike a fair balance.

This was a reasonable doubt of administrators infused with the idea of enforcing sensitivity. But the speech codes that gave the alarm to Downs were not the worst danger to free speech in the universities, nor are they today. Those codes prohibited racial slurs and unwelcome lewd overtures—unpleasant, to be sure, to blacks and women, but hardly posing grave risks. They were interpreted, however, in a spirit of political correctness so as to produce a numbing homogeneity of opinion at our universities, and that spirit has proved very harmful. The

idea of sensitivity behind the speech codes also led to political correctness, because it was necessary to decide to whom to be sensitive. Being sensitive to blacks and women gave them the right to be offended when they pleased and to talk back offensively to their tormentors. *They* did not have to be sensitive except to the insensitivity they were subject to, and they were encouraged to react with indignation whenever they felt they were put upon.

Thus, the notion of sensitivity led to less toleration rather than more. Those not tolerated were, of course, conservatives. The victims Downs tells of were not conservatives (they were mostly naive and nonpolitical) and some of his faculty and student heroes were conservatives. Conservatives were silenced not so much by speech codes as by not being hired for the faculty and not being invited to give talks or lectures on campus. Some conservative speakers were intimidated by protests; but for the most part, conservatives were simply not there and not invited. First Amendment liberals prefer the cause of the embattled and give little thought to the need for a balance of reasonable or respectable opinion in universities. To exaggerate: They will defend you *only* if they hate you, or if you are being persecuted. The near-total exclusion of conservatives from the faculties of America's elite universities does not alarm them. The fact that partisan debate outside the universities is freer and livelier than within may be deplorable, but it does not strike them as a free speech issue. They take for granted the willingness of citizens to speak up. They become indignant at the suppression of speech, but worry much less about speech that it never occurs to anyone to express.

A society of free speech needs lively exchange between the parties and not just loud voices from its eccentric fringe—and this is true, too, for universities. For lively exchange you need balance, as it is easy for a dominant majority to be unruffled by dissent when it is only from a token few. One could seek balance by declaring partisan opinion to be academically irrelevant, as when President Robert Sproul

Reuters / CORBIS / Shaun Heasley



at Berkeley in the 1930s (Downs notes) banned the use of university buildings for partisan purposes. Many social scientists in universities follow a similar logic when they adopt the fact/value distinction: "My science is over here and my values are over there; there's no connection!" The fact that most all of us are liberals, and hardly any conservative, is therefore irrelevant. Science is what matters, and that is impartial.

This attitude coexists at universities today with the opposite, postmodern view that science is only a mask of impartiality to conceal the partisan exercise of power. True impartiality being impossible, in this view, we should embrace partiality and politicize the university. Either way, whether from positivism or postmodernism, conservatives lose out. They are not necessary to be heard, and if they are heard, they do harm to progressive causes.

Mention of progress brings up the second problem for free speech liberals, the problem of truth. Liberals stand for progress and, for self-protection, sometimes call themselves progressives. They also stand for diversity and speak of it constantly. Yet progress is hostile to diversity, especially to the diversity that conservatives represent. Progress is progress in truth, in the overcoming of prejudice such as racism, sexism, and homophobia. By identifying and refuting prejudice,

progress establishes the reign of truth and narrows the range of acceptable opinions. What, then, is to be done about conservatives who hold these prejudices? Today, conservatives do not, or no longer, hold to racial prejudice, and anyone who does has been banished from responsible discussion. But is it the same for sexism and homophobia? Has debate on these matters been foreclosed, and does it deserve to be?

If liberals agree that one can still believe in sex differences and in the superiority of heterosexual life, they then consent to diversity and admit that conservatism in these respects is respectable. If they do, however, they set limits to progress in truth, or in the spread of truth. They justify a society balanced between liberals and conservatives, the party of progress and the party of order, as John Stuart Mill called them. But this seems to be a society of truth and untruth, permanently divided, which prevents the triumph of truth, of liberalism.

How can liberals accept that? Or respect it? Mill says that truth will become dead dogma if it is not challenged by opposing views, which is his reason for tolerating conservatives. But the problem is that if truth is systematically challenged, it will not be paramount. Diversity will replace truth.

This problem is more acute in universities as opposed to society in general, because universities are dedicated to

the pursuit of truth. Downs notes that the difference between free speech and academic freedom is that the latter, unlike the former, relates to truth. A society can have free speech, *pace* the ACLU, if it does not challenge its own basic presuppositions, like those in the Declaration of Independence. But a university must, in pursuit of truth, hold those presuppositions open to inquiry. To carry out such inquiry, a university would seem to have greater need of diversity than a society. A university would not want to foreclose questions that a society might consider settled.

Conservatism is therefore closer to the mission of the university than liberalism is. Liberals, insofar as they are progressives, believe that it is possible to eliminate prejudice from society. When prejudice is gone, truth prevails, and there is no need to reconsider the errors of the past. Progress is irrevocable, and inquiry shrinks to whatever questions remain unsettled. Conservatives, believing that it is not possible to eliminate prejudice, are more tolerant than liberals; they expect society to be, and remain, a mixture of truth and untruth. Conservatives may be prejudiced themselves, or they may be just tolerant of prejudice in others. If society will always be a mixture of truth and untruth, it may be necessary to see what sort of untruth is politically compatible with truth, and what sort is not.

This is the problem we face in judging the civil rights of terrorists, a problem Downs alludes to but does not discuss. We surely do not need speech codes to hobble conservatives—they should be listened to!—but we may well need measures to suppress the preaching of Islamic terrorists. There we have true hate speech composed of hateful ideas, and as a conservative once said, ideas have consequences.

But Downs points out that the idea of sensitivity erodes the difference between speaking and doing. The function of speech comes to be preserving the self-esteem of those spoken to, rather than addressing them; and sexual harassment, a certain behavior, comes to include words found offensive. ♦



Public Nuisances

*Some are dangerous, and some are just pains
in the neck.* BY JOE QUEENAN

On page 56 of this scatter-shot attack on the legions of Satan, the veteran reporter Bernard Goldberg singles out the clear and present danger posed to the Republic by one Matthew Lesko. Lesko is the blathering ninny who turns up in late-night infomercials clownishly exhorting the public to access the Himalayas of “free money” sitting around in government coffers.

Is Lesko annoying? Very. Is he manipulative, willfully misleading, only too ready to bend the truth for his own purposes? Almost certainly. But does anyone seriously believe that a shilling goofball marooned in the bowels of late-night cable television is doing irreparable harm to our nation in the manner of Eminem or Kenneth Lay or Paris Hilton? The notion that Goldberg would include someone as innocuous as Matthew Lesko on his list of Public Enemies Number 1–100—a list that includes such gilt-edged anacondas as Michael Moore, Al Sharpton, and Barbra Streisand—creates the unsettling suspicion that the author could only come up with about 42 people that he really hated, and then had to pad out the list with ringers.

Happily, it is the eccentric, unscientific nature of Goldberg’s enemies list that makes this volume readable, in the sense that slapdash books of this nature can ever be truly called “readable.” Everyone knows Goldberg’s

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shtick—liberal bias ruined America and my career, even though I do have eight Emmys—so no one is going to be terribly surprised that Dan Rather, Barbara Walters, Diane Sawyer, Bill Moyers, and a host of journalists far more famous than Goldberg rear their increasingly ugly heads on his list.

Nor will those conversant with Goldberg’s pissed-off-old-white-millionaire-everyman persona be shocked when he refers to Walters as “the Queen of Crap,” which she most assuredly is. Few will be stunned to see the names Teddy Kennedy, Jesse Jackson, Jimmy Carter, Al Gore, Julian Bond, Noam Chomsky, and Maxine Waters surface on Goldberg’s roll call of the officially proscribed. Unsurprisingly, punching bags such as Paul Krugman, Al Franken, and Jonathan Kozol all report for their licks, as do cultural villains on the order of Michael Jackson, Ludacris, Courtney Love, Tim Robbins, and the hypnotically uninteresting Janeane Garofalo.

What separates the angry, inelegantly written, hugely derivative *100 People Who Are Screwing Up America* from all the other angry, inelegantly written, hugely derivative books about people who are screwing up America is the author’s endearing penchant for hauling his personal *bêtes noires* in from left field and giving them a shellacking just for the hell of it. For those of us who specialize in gratuitous cruelty, there is nothing more satisfying than a totally unoccasioned *ad hominem* attack on a hapless target triggered by, apparently, nothing. (An example: Molly Ivins is not even mentioned in Goldberg’s book and has absolutely nothing

**100 People Who Are
Screwing Up America**
by Bernard Goldberg
HarperCollins, 305 pp., \$25.95

to do with this review, but this seems like a nice time to point out that the talentless, gutless pinko, who gave a negative review to my first book and then canceled out of a television appearance on the same show as me, has been accused of filching material from other, far more talented, writers. On more than one occasion. For more details, consult Florence King, Clive James, et al.) Thus, in a book that mercilessly tees off on Alec Baldwin, Martin Sheen, Katha Pollitt, and other certified dimwits, Goldberg goes out of his way to blast Anna Nicole Smith, a harmless fatso; Phil Donahue, a harmless has-been; and Kate Hudson, the feather-headed spawn of the equally innocuous Goldie Hawn and the supernaturally inoffensive Kurt Russell.

He also trashes Sheila Jackson Lee, the misguided but not especially pernicious Democratic congresswoman from Texas who wants more hurricanes named Jamal, DeShawn, and LaToya, as a point of racial pride, and accuses Paul Begala of being a "left-wing hater-monger," whereas most of us thought he was merely an idiot. He attacks Internet celebrities no one has ever heard of, academics who are not household names, artists who are not important, bureaucrats no one could pick out of a police lineup, and A-team novelists like Jane Smiley who, whatever her failings as a political theorist, can actually write original, moving prose, which Goldberg cannot.

Still, there are statutes of limitations on even the most noble vendettas, and sometimes Goldberg's variations give off the unambiguous fragrance of mold. Seeking to even old scores, and I mean *old* scores, Goldberg acts as if the geriatric Norman Mailer is still a vital force in this society, lambastes the increasingly pathetic, irrelevant Oliver Stone, and singles out David Duke for what he clearly believes to be a long overdue woodshedding. It's as if he started writing this book in 1979, set it aside for 25 years, then precipitously exhumed it, threw in a few generic remarks about how much he hates gangsta rap, and published it as is. No, there is nothing wrong with hating the

enemy, but to be a worthy adversary one's nemesis must at least still be breathing. Oliver Stone's last movie was the disastrous *Alexander*; David Duke hasn't been a vital force in Louisiana politics for years, and never made any impact nationally; and even Norman Mailer knows he is too old to fulfill the role of Minister of Evil. Besides, Michael Moore's got it locked up.

This brings us to the subject of Harry Belafonte. A congenial has-been who last had a hit in 1937, Belafonte once referred to Colin Powell as a "house slave." This is poisonous, stupid, dishonest, unmanly. That is not the point. Unlike Howard Stern, Eminem, Jerry Springer, Howard Dean, and, of course, Michael Moore, who exercise tremendous power in this society,

Harry Belafonte is a foolish old man, a relic, a joke. (Rule of thumb: If people under the age of 30 haven't heard of you, you are probably not Beelzebub.) From the perspective of the embattled conservative, who sees his cause triumphing in the political arena but ceaselessly ceding terrain on the cultural battlefield, Michael Moore is smallpox, Martin Sheen is cholera, Barbra Streisand is yellow fever, Susan Sarandon is typhus. By comparison, Harry Belafonte is a mild case of tendonitis. This is worrying. If a seasoned malingerer like Bernard Goldberg cannot produce anyone more sinister than Harry Belafonte to put on his list of seditious ne'er-do-wells, it strongly suggests that things are not nearly as bad in this country as many of us believe. The same holds true for Wallace Shawn: If the hideous gnome who played the chubby dwarf in *The Princess Bride* is the 85th scariest guy in Goldberg's Personal House of Horrors, this country

Time Life Pictures / Getty Images / David Rubinger



Harry Belafonte, 1960

has seriously lowered its standards of terror.

This brings us to the final question. When Al Franken or Janeane Garofalo or someone even worse responds to Goldberg's insults by writing a parody of *100 People Who Are Screwing Up America*, who will appear on their list? Obviously, Mel Gibson will make a fine stand-in for Oliver Stone; clearly Arnold Schwarzenegger can do yeoman service as the right-wing version of Tim Robbins. But where does the right come up with a demon as malignant as Eminem? Where does the right find an ex-president as sanctimonious and unctuous and insufferable as Jimmy Carter? Where does the right look for a scoundrel as dapper and stylish as Al Sharpton? And where, oh where, is the right going to find its very own Harry Belafonte?

Frankly, I don't think the conservative movement has anyone in a class with Harry Belafonte. And that's why conservatives are just no fun. ♦



small impediment that we never knew exactly where they were,' Britain's prime minister, Lord Salisbury remarked sardonically."

Starting with a chapter on the independence of Ghana from Britain in 1957, Meredith details the always painful, and generally disastrous, experience of African self-rule. The notable exception is Botswana, a country that moved peacefully from British colony to democratic African state, with private property rights, rule of law, economic growth, and increasing standards of health care (albeit a huge AIDS problem). But while Botswana is a shining star on the continent, its luminescence is enhanced by the catastrophes around it, its achievements more moderate by Asian standards. Of 53 countries, only Botswana and post-apartheid South Africa may be considered successful.

The current trend, much favored by United Nations advisory panels, is to say that Africa has unique problems of geography and disease, which is why it is poor. Meredith blames governance. Uncaring colonial powers gave way to despotic African leaders, often pawns in the Cold War. Today, corrupt leaders must shoulder the blame. Africa is a continent where people still go into government to make money. As Meredith explains about Nigeria (although the analysis can easily be applied to other countries), during colonial times, it was seen as acceptable to rip off the government: "The same attitude prevailed with the coming of independence. The state was regarded as a foreign institution that could be used for personal and community gain without any sense of shame or need for accountability. Plunderers of the government treasury were often excused on the grounds that they had only 'taken their share.'"

The most fascinating parts are the portraits of the "big men," the leaders, most of whom were despots, ruling in the belief that they were infallible or God-like. Mengistu Haile Miriam of Ethiopia, Idi Amin of Uganda, Mobutu of Zaire, Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, to name but a few. Accustomed to endless



Africa Betrayed

Tyrants are the continent's principal natural resource.

BY ROGER BATE

Not since *The Scramble for Africa* by Thomas Pakenham has an author had the temerity to attempt to document the key moments of history of the entire African continent over half a century. But where Pakenham's book, covering the European colonization of the continent, occasionally failed to maintain interest, Martin Meredith's book consistently grabs and holds your attention.

This is, probably, a magnificent achievement. From Cairo to Cape Town, from Dakar to Djibouti, Meredith understands what is important and what the reader will want to learn. I say "probably" simply because I can only judge the writing on the countries I know something about; but where I have knowledge, he is spot on. If the rest of the book is as accurate as the chapters on Southern Africa, this is a seminal work.

I read the chapter about the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda more avidly than any part of any nonfiction book I have ever encountered. It is compellingly

written and appalling to comprehend. Even Francophiles will be disillusioned by that country's politics, and disastrous and mendacious involvement in the Rwanda crisis. But no country gets a free ride. Britain's colonial legacy and contemporary policies are rightly decried in several chapters (notably on Sudan and Egypt), as is America's calamitous involvement with Mobutu Sese Seko's leadership in Zaire and the debacles in Liberia and Somalia. The

Sudanese import of Osama bin Laden and Islamic influences in the region get an interesting, careful, and highly critical discussion as well.

Where Pakenham dramatized the colonization of Africa, Meredith discusses the less exciting withdrawal from the continent, and how black African rule emerged. Meredith knows the importance of colonial history, and how much of the blame for Africa's failure lies with it. He writes: "As the haggling in Europe over African territory continued, land and peoples became little more than pieces on a chess board. 'We have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the

The Fate of Africa
From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair; a History of 50 Years of Independence
by Martin Meredith
PublicAffairs, 734 pp., \$35

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praise, it is not surprising to learn that absolute power tended to corrupt them absolutely.

Idi Amin is the most vividly evoked. Having proclaimed himself the king of Scotland, he liked to fire off bizarre cables to foreign leaders: "He wished President Nixon 'a speedy recovery from Watergate'; offered Britain's music-loving prime minister, Edward Heath, a post as bandmaster after his election defeat; advised Israel's Golda Meir 'to tuck up her knickers' and run to Washington; suggested to Mao Tse-tung that he should mediate in the Sino-Soviet dispute; and proposed himself as head of the Commonwealth." But Meredith tempers such amusing anecdotes with the knowledge that Amin had probably 200,000 of his subjects murdered.

For political scientists and economists, the more interesting critiques are of the less colorful, but equally disastrous, socialist leaders, such as Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) and many others. All were driven by Communist ideals, and all destroyed their countries' economies.

Although this book was written too early to discuss this summer's Live 8 concerts and Tony Blair's move to push Africa up the political agenda at the G8 summit, Meredith does deal most interestingly with the Live Aid concerts of 1985 and how the money raised was largely wasted, given that the cause of Ethiopia's famine was the vile Mengistu regime. That section demonstrates Meredith's skepticism about aid, and leads this reader to the conclusion that nothing changed then, and nothing will change now, unless Africans and their leaders make change a priority—something Meredith concludes is possible, and is happening in many places.

Meredith first traveled up the Nile from Cairo in 1964 as a 21-year-old and claims that, in many ways, his "African journey has continued ever since." His careful, detailed analysis, his dispassionate but not detached writing, and his evident wit mean that we might all hope his journey continues for much longer. ♦



A Camelot Minute

Arthur Schlesinger's 'Vital Center' hasn't held.

BY FRED SIEGEL

In 1949, two landmark political works—Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* and Peter Viereck's *Conservatism Revisited*—seemed to define the new postwar shape of American politics. The two books were beautifully wrought essays written by friends, both Harvard-educated historians of considerable breadth. The 32-year-old Schlesinger's book redefined liberalism for the generation that had fought its way through the Depression and World War II, while the 33-year-old Viereck's essay was hailed as the first account of "the new conservatism." Both men, the children of politically committed parents, defined themselves in opposition to fascism and communism, "the twin evils of totalitarianism," even as they were unambiguous critics of what they saw as Sen. Joseph McCarthy's vulgar populism.

Writing almost in parallel, Schlesinger and Viereck staked out positions in which a philosophical conservatism based on a sense of man's fallen nature was used to leverage a modulated political optimism grounded in a prudent empiricism. Together, Schlesinger and Viereck, generally men of almost Erasmian balance, feared the impact on democracy of the "anxieties" induced by freedom. Writing in the wake of the mass movements that had convulsed Europe, they were disdainful of laissez-faire capitalism and of the Babbley they associated with business leaders, even as they

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looked to elites to contain democracy's rawer tendencies. But today Viereck's book is all but forgotten, while *The Vital Center* continues to be discussed by liberals almost as if it were written by a contemporary.

What accounts for the eclipse of one and the continued allure of the other?

**The Vital Center:
The Politics of Freedom**
by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.
Transaction, 274 pp., \$24.95

Some significance should be attached to the way they made their arguments. Neither man was sensitive to the ethnic and religious dimensions of American life. But in a short book, Viereck spent, as he later acknowledged, far too much time explicating the virtues of Klemens von Metternich, the Austrian architect of the long post-Napoleonic peace in Europe. America's postwar alliance system, as well as the still-promising United Nations, were, it was true, influenced by the way Metternich had tried to contain the earlier ideological scourge of Jacobinism. But Americans had a hard time connecting with Metternich, an aristocrat who insisted on "deference" from his social inferiors.

Schlesinger's heroes were more accessible. In *The Vital Center* he argued that Franklin Roosevelt was continuing the course embarked on by Andrew Jackson, who fought the privileged power of the Bank of the United States in the name of popular aspirations, just as FDR championed the average American when he took on the "economic royalists." This tack grounded the New Deal's state-brokered compromises between free market capitalism and the claims of "community" in homegrown traditions.

Schlesinger's critics, such as historian Marvin Meyers, insisted that he had gotten Jackson all wrong. The

Jacksonians, Meyers argued with considerable skill and evidence, looked to free markets as a bulwark against the privileges they associated with political arrangements. But Meyers and other critics had little popular impact. Schlesinger succeeded in persuading most liberals that the New Deal was far more than just a temporary bargain to meet the emergency of the Great Depression. Rather, liberals became convinced, and many remained convinced, that the New Deal arrangements not only reflected, but culminated for all time, the ceaseless struggle between business and the people that defined American history.

Viereck's Burkean gradualism was a partisan dead end. In 1952, much to the dismay of other conservatives, he supported the Democrat Adlai Stevenson for president. By the mid-1950s he was being bypassed by an alternative strand of conservatism more attuned to America's vigorously capitalist past and far less burdened by the fear of populism as a harbinger of totalitarianism. In his 1962 introduction for a new edition of *The New Conservatism*, an overwrought Viereck denounced the political populism of the William Buckley/Barry Goldwater brand of conservatism as "a façade for either plutocratic profiteering or fascist style thought control nationalism." This populist or "street corner" conservatism, as it was known in the cities, marked the beginning of a political break with both Viereck's focus on the madness of the 1930s and the Republicans' residual stick-in-the-mud pre-New Deal politics.

Schlesinger's resolutely partisan approach to politics and policy endured—though, by the early 1950s, Viereck and the liberal historian Eric Goldman were already pointing out that liberalism was increasingly small-“c” conservative in its defense of New Deal policies, which might or might not stand the test of time.

A great deal of ink has been wasted over whether Schlesinger got communism and the Cold War right. He did. Writing before the publication of George Orwell's *1984*, or Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*

or Jacob Talmon's even more substantial *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, he argued that "the totalitarian left and the totalitarian right meet at last . . . on the grounds of terror and tyranny." Schlesinger, who anticipated the Sino-Soviet split, saw that communism was "if anything a passing stage . . . a disease" that may afflict some "in the quest for modernity." The rebarbative attacks—from the New Left which blamed him for McCarthyism and Vietnam, and from the right which dismissed him as a timid professor unwilling to confront evil in the world—are best forgotten.

In retrospect, Schlesinger relied far too heavily on Eric Fromm's now-forgotten, then-fashionable ideas about the anxiety of individuality. But much of *The Vital Center* is a fount of common sense for liberals. He dismissed the left-wing hysterics who warn of impending American fascism. He mocked the neurotic "wailers" who used "liberalism as an outlet for private grievances and frustrations," as compared with the "doers" who commit themselves to the "tedious study of detail" in order "to assume the burden of civic responsibility." And he was contemptuous of the "doughfaces," a term which originally applied to Northern men of Southern principles during the Civil War, but which he applied to Henry Wallace and the fellow travelers who were "democratic men with totalitarian principles." Although the term never caught on, the contemporary parallels are all too obvious.

The Vital Center has obvious weaknesses. Schlesinger, as he would later admit, had vastly underestimated the dynamism of American capitalism, and he had almost nothing to say about the problem of state-brokered interest groups. Eric Goldman's paean to the New Deal, *Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform*, published three years later, ends pessimistically but presciently, noting that "the process of the atomization of 'the people' into special interest groups" posed a threat to the viability of liberalism.

But the key problem at the emo-

tional and political heart of the book has gone virtually unnoticed. The political and cultural snobbery that informs *The Vital Center* has proved the undoing of American liberalism. Schlesinger's politics were driven less by a concern for the well-being of most Americans than a burning hostility toward business, despite its crucial role in winning World War II. Writing about *The Vital Center* in his memoirs, he acknowledged that he had been "captivated by [Joseph] Schumpeter's aristocratic scorn for merchants, as I had been by George Sorel's contempt for the cowardice of the bourgeoisie." The second, overlooked chapter of *The Vital Center* on "The Failure of the Right" reproduces in tone and content the warrior critique of business civilization adopted by Theodore Roosevelt, who disdained capitalists as people with the "ideals . . . [of] pawnbrokers."

Drawing on the resentful writings of Brooke, Charles, and Henry Adams, Schlesinger insisted that "the normal American businessman is insecure and confused. . . . Tear away the veil of Rotarian self-congratulation or Marxist demonology, and you are likely to find the irresolute and hesitating figure of George F. Babbitt." He reveled in Charles Francis Adams's statement that "I have known and tolerably well a good many 'successful' men—'big' financially—and a less interesting crowd I do not care to encounter." But even more important, while he acknowledges the necessity of a leadership class even in a democracy, he insists that "timid" business people are incapable of joining that governing stratum.

"The capitalists," he insisted, quoting Henry Cabot Lodge, "have not been, in the political sense, an effective governing class." What we needed, he said, was "the advantage of an intelligent aristocracy," referring to Winston Churchill. But he never specified where that aristocracy was to come from, although he obviously thought that Harvard-educated men such as himself should be at the heart of it.

Franklin Roosevelt temporarily

reconciled elitism and majoritarianism. The New Deal's Brain Trust was seen and understood by most Americans to be acting on behalf, in FDR's words, "of the will of the great majority of the people as distinguished from the judgment of a small minority." New Deal liberalism had been erected on the understanding that it was the job of a self-effacing elite, acting on behalf of the government, to protect the virtuous people from rapacious business interests. But it was an unstable arrangement.

The Vital Center was written in the wake of Harry Truman's come-from-behind victory in the 1948 election, which seemed to be a vindication for the politics Schlesinger advanced. Truman had triumphed over not only Republicans and business, but also over Henry Wallace and the supporters of the Soviet Union on the left and Strom Thurmond and the Dixiecrat segregationists on the right, in the name of advancing the Fair Deal's extensions of the New Deal. But Schlesinger could barely bring himself to mention the Missouri haberdasher's name in the book. Earlier, he had written that "not only is [Truman] himself a man of mediocre and limited capacity . . . [but] he has managed to surround himself with his intellectual equals." Truman was so socially unacceptable that Schlesinger had briefly joined the movement to draft the stately Dwight D. Eisenhower for president in 1948, although he later admitted that he had no idea of the general's political views. Truman reciprocated in kind: He quipped that "there should be a real liberal party in this country, and I don't mean a crackpot professional one."

John F. Kennedy's Camelot of the "best and the brightest" was able to, once again, temporarily reconcile the tension between enlightened elite leadership (as Schlesinger saw it) and popular sentiment. But in the wake of Vietnam and the urban riots of the 1960s, the New Left liberals of the post-Kennedy era saw, and continue to see, the people themselves and the American culture they embody as the

problem that demands government action. By 1968, the Schlesinger who had once totemized Jacksonian working men and 1930s American nationalists described Americans "as the most frightening people on this planet." At times, he has referred to the tension between what he described as "the educated few and the uneducated many," as when he warned that the Eugene McCarthy presidential campaign was turning the Democratic party into a "semiprecious rally of the *illuminati*." But by 1972 Schlesinger was supporting George McGovern, the candidate of the *illuminati*. In the aftermath of McGovern's landslide defeat, AFL-CIO operative Al Barkan swore, "We aren't going to let those Harvard-Berkeley Camels take over the party." But they did.

In the new liberalism that emerged out of the political cauldron of the 1960s, professionals such as lawyers and social workers protected victimized groups from a supposedly virulent majority. But too often, professionals have a vested interest in inflating their own worth at the expense of those they look to instruct. "Uncertain . . . of the nature of their constituency," wrote James Nuechterlein in 1977, "many liberals tend to cover their confusion with an intense if generally unfocused moralism."

Today, Schlesinger's "educated few" have become a multitude in their own right. In England, they have their own party, the Liberal Democrats; in the United States they are stuck in an uneasy cohabitation with representatives of the unwashed. No longer self-



Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., 1957

effacing servants of working America, as in the 1930s, or of victims' groups, as in the 1970s and '80s, they are increasingly, as in the Howard Dean campaign, looking for power in their own right.

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., a Bourbon liberal who proudly states in his memoirs that he has the same views now that he did when he wrote *The Vital Center* in 1949, has little to say about this dilemma. But the attitudes he advanced in *The Vital Center* live on in the aristocratic snobbery of professional liberals, in both senses of the term, who expect, given their putative expertise, to be obeyed. Faced with a disobedient public, as in recent elections, their impotence has expressed itself in the same disdain for Middle America that Schlesinger once reserved for businessmen. ♦

Dearest Daddy

The sheep in Wolf's clothing is not Naomi.

BY JUDY BACHRACH

In her hoary book *The Beauty Myth*, Naomi Wolf argued that being a great looker is not the result of fine genes and high-quality lip gloss, both of which the author appears to possess in abundance, but "the choice to do whatever we want with our faces and bodies without being punished by an ideology that is using attitudes, economic pressure, and even legal judgments regarding women's appearance to undermine us psychologically and politically."

It was, interestingly, precisely this sort of patience-enhancing exposition that turned the book into a 1991 best-seller and, eight years later, Ms. Wolf into a \$15,000-a-month image adviser to presidential aspirant Al Gore.

That was a difficult and, perhaps, counterproductive alliance, more the result of Ms. Wolf's friendship with Gore's daughter, Karenna (a relationship described at the time, naturally, as "bonding"), than any actual value she might have had for the campaign. The Democratic candidate was ordered, for example, to wear earth tones because, in the public eye, they are "more reassuring"—than what, Ms. Wolf never quite said: possibly than Mr. Gore.

She is not, in other words, a woman who is easily defined or always right. To take just one more example, one reason (aside from her breathtaking salary) most Gore confidants so distrusted Ms. Wolf is that she appeared in their midst shortly

after the release of *Promiscuities*, her third book. Well, you can probably divine its contents. In it the author argued that heavy petting and oral sex should be "something schools should teach teenagers." She wanted, she said, "to explore the shadow slut who walks alongside us as we grow up."

So imagine my consternation on being told to write a review of Ms. Wolf's latest *oeuvre*, which is not at all concerned with sluts, oral sex, or the beauty industry that penalizes furry legs and court-orders mascara. It is called *The Treehouse*, and it is not about the figurative "phallocentric patriarchy" the author openly despises but about Ms. Wolf's own actual father, who is 80 years old, very nice, and named Leonard. Yes, just like Virginia's husband, except even more literary and understanding. Also, he spells his last name right.

I'm very much afraid that Leonard is the kind of father Ms. Wolf does not deserve. He helps build a treehouse for his granddaughter. He writes poetry and he teaches it. Like most of the universe, he doesn't think Naomi should have ever dispensed advice to Gore. But not because Gore dresses badly or is, as Naomi so rudely phrased it in internal memos, a beta-male who has to work overtime at alphasizing himself. No, Leonard thinks Naomi shouldn't have abetted those presidential ambitions because . . . hmm . . . "such a thing seemed like a kind of prostitution of whatever gifts I had." In fact, Leonard argues to his daughter—legitimately, one feels—

"No one else has your particular voice."

Naomi couldn't agree more. "I saw exactly what he meant. But children always need to overthrow their fathers, especially when the fathers are right."

Another thing that divides the child from the father, the author informs us, is that she, Naomi, is a raging "commercial success with my first book—the world of greenrooms and TV sound bites . . ." And guess who isn't a raging success? Time and again, our gal decries her own "arrogance" and the "little peace" she is allotted thanks to her incredible celebrity. But really, all she wants the reader to know is how bone-rattlingly FATIGUED she is to be "besieged by e-mail, CNN headlines, phone calls."

(This is, as it turns out, a favorite theme of hers. I once called her myself, only to get cut off in mid-introduction by a loud voice, stiff and angry with outrage: "HOW DID YOU GET MY NUMBER?" By way of reply, I think I said something snippy and Warholish. Twenty minutes later, Ms. Wolf phoned back, apologetic in her fashion. Due to the immense avalanche of fame and publicity that threatened to engulf her, she was being, she said, "stalked." At first, she hadn't caught my name. Now what was it I wanted?)

As for Leonard, he wrote 20 books. ("Some have done well; others were ignored," his daughter writes helpfully.) He shows Naomi how to hang brackets for curtains and gives her friends excellent advice on romance.


He says, "The God I don't believe in and I get along very well," which is an extremely polite way of dealing with eternity. Delmore Schwartz, who was very crazy and alcoholic, once threatened to kill him, after erroneously fingering Mr. Wolf as the seducer of his wife.

What can one say? He's a peach. Hanging brackets and hanging out. Now that's a legacy. I cannot tell you how envious I am. Or how unhappy. I wish he had written this book. ♦

Judy Bachrach is a contributing editor to *Vanity Fair*.

The Standard Reader

Books in Brief



The Roots of Evil by John Kekes (Cornell University Press, 261 pp., \$29.95) In the face of "softhearts" who believe that not even a ruthless terrorist is an evildoer, John Kekes seeks in *The Roots of Evil* to articulate why people commit evil and why evildoers should be held accountable. Crafting a "secular realist" explanation of iniquity, he avoids both "esoteric" Christian/Platonic accounts of good and evil and Pollyannaish Enlightenment notions about the perfectibility of man provided he is properly introduced to reason.

Selecting six situations of evil—ranging from the Albigensian crusade to Robespierre's Reign of Terror to Charles Manson's rampages—Kekes, in intellectual fashion, provides possible excuses and rationalizations, before affirming that, indeed, such actions, and the actors involved, were evil.

Kekes's subsequent discussion of the roots of peccancy is lucid, though prone to frustrating repetition. Describing common explanations of evil, ranging from religious to biological, he attempts to refute each. He claims that evil, rather, is the product of a blend of sundry factors—both internal (e.g., individual will) and external (e.g., upbringing). Kekes deems his theory, which removes the supernatural from the discussion while maintaining the real existence of evil, more accurate than those offered by anyone else in history, as he incorporates—or rejects—aspects of theories developed by thinkers ranging from Aquinas to Kant to Arendt.

In addition to pure "rationality," Kekes claims that envy and boredom often lead to evildoing, particularly in the contemporary West (in the Middle Ages there was not much time to allow for "casual" evil). The reintro-duction of the "moral imagination" (a

term coined by Edmund Burke) into education may help folks resist the thrill of evil, he suggests. Such a humanistic, nonreligious imagination will allow people in prosperous societies to find fulfilling alternatives—bowling, perhaps—to evildoing.

Kekes calls for a secular movement "toward elementary decency," as he attacks relativists who grow squeamish at the suggestion that evil exists. His dislike of such moral lightweights is evident in a few gems of invective—crisp, entertaining sentences that stand out in a work of generally stoical logic.

Kekes believes that his realistic, nuanced approach to evil will better equip society to mitigate its effects, make it less likely to occur, and punish the perpetrators. Though many surely will disagree with his arguments, he provides a compelling perspective.

—Joseph Lindsley



The Historian by Elizabeth Kostova, (Little, Brown, 642 pp., \$25.95) Ah, the sweet mystery of hype. *Publishers Weekly* has proclaimed Elizabeth Kostova's first novel as the one sleeper work to emerge from summer as a blockbuster. "The it book of the season if not the year seems to have appeared," writes editor in chief Sara Nelson.

Nelson describes a "carefully calibrated advertising campaign" that landed *The Historian* as number one on the PW bestseller list as well as the *New York Times*'s. In less than a month, Little, Brown went back to press three times and currently has more than 800,000 copies of the book in print.

The publishers are so giddy over the sales figures that they recently took out a full-page ad in the Arts section of the *Times*, declaring *The Historian* "destined for immortality." And yes, the book has of course been

optioned by Hollywood, and foreign rights have been sold in 28 countries.

So, what's got everyone in such a twitter? For starters, some 7,000 advance reading copies were sent forth sometime in the spring—including one to me. And after some couple hundred pages, I simply couldn't take it any longer—I who in the course of careers in publishing and moviemaking have made my way through more soul-numbing prose than any human ought to have faced.

But the publicity taunted me. I went out, bought a copy (I'd long since given away the copy sent me), and pressed through the whole thing. Kostova's premise is that Dracula has been walking around the world since the late fifteenth century, biting folks in the neck to turn them into the undead. At the risk of being a vile spoiler, you're going to have to navigate some 576 pages to discover why.

You're going to have to wade through passages like: "Despite its famously frustrating incompleteness, the Zacharias 'Chronicle,' with the embedded 'Tale of Stefan the Wanderer,' is an important source of confirmation of Christian pilgrimage routes in the fifteenth-century Balkans, as well as information about the fate of the body of Vlad III 'Tepes' of Wallachia, long believed to have been buried at the monastery on Lake Snagov (in present-day Romania)."

Kostova takes readers on the long trip of a daughter trying to find her father who is trying to find a colleague who has gone missing in a quest for the dread Dracula. The father leaves long written messages for the daughter. The missing colleague leaves hidden diaries. Trains are taken. Airplanes are flown. Tea is drunk. Coffee is drunk. Cafés are sat in. And so it goes on and on and on for all those hundreds of pages.

—Cynthia Grenier

"Clear is the ulterior intention of the U.S. . . . to disarm the DPRK and stifle it with nuke."

—North Korean Central News Agency, 9/21/05

"The North Koreans will make odd statements at their leisure."

—Chief U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill
to the New York Times, 9/21/05

Parody



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MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIX-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

September 2005, Beijing

At session 34, discussions continued between the representatives of Japan, China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States.

Talk of the nuclear issue began with China suggesting a review of some key points of agreement from the previous meeting. Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States concurred. North Korea agreed but requested a dolphin, "a striped one, not a bottlenose." Participants in the talks told North Korea that a dolphin might not immediately be available. North Korea said that no one had requested a dolphin. North Korea mused that it would be enjoyable to meet actress Kirsten Dunst at the Spider Club in Los Angeles.

Japan reiterated the proposal to review points of agreement. North Korea strongly concurred but also denounced the nation of Japan as an "imperialist ogre" and a "political dwarf." North Korea then broke into tears, embraced Japan, and presented all parties to the talks with gifts of pickled cabbage, or *kimchi*.

Russia said that it conveyed the friendly sentiments of the Russian people and its hope for a reunited Korean peninsula. North Korea asked Russia to try the *kimchi*. Russia said it preferred to save it for later. North Korea said the *kimchi* was best fresh. Russia said it might have it this evening at the hotel. North Korea asked Russia if Russia disliked *kimchi*. Russia said no, of course not, but Russia preferred to eat it later. North Korea offered to suspend all nuclear programs and to disband the North Korean system of government, replacing it with a capitalist democracy, if Russia would eat the gift *kimchi* in 60 seconds. South Korea and Russia asked North Korea to repeat the offer. North Korea praised Kim Jong Il and requested five light-water reactors. South Korea said, "No, the part about the *kimchi*." North Korea said that this was no time to discuss *kimchi*.

North Korea suggested that all parties present, including North Korea, detonate one nuclear bomb in a midsized city in their own country as a confidence-building measure. North Korea said it would gladly destroy Kaesong if the other parties would explode Vladivostok, Wuhan, Yokohama, and Salt Lake City. The United States asked for alternative confidence-building suggestions. North Korea suggested that Salt Lake City might be substituted with Fresno. When the United States spoke of less destructive measures, North Korea invited Jenna Bush to Pyongyang to see a performance of a 100,000-person dance show, "Arirang." The United States indicated that Jenna Bush might be busy but that Neil Bush was available. North Korea became agitated and declared the talks a failure.